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The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) took the international community by 
surprise in June 2014 by defeating the Iraqi military in multiple battles that culminated in the 
seizure of Mosul, Iraq on 10 June 2014. On 30 June 2014, ISIS publicly declared a Caliphate 
that stretches from northern Syria to the outskirts of Baghdad. This occurred due to 
corruption and sectarian strife of the Maliki regime, alongside the departure of US forces in 
2011. The issue of ISIS is a sectarian issue 1,400 years in the making and likely to be 
unresolved short of overwhelming military force in Iraq and Syria combined with sweeping 
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The last fourteen years have been an intense roller-coaster ride for American citizens 
and policy makers with regard to terrorism. Prior to the “Manhattan Raid”1 conducted by Al 
Qaeda on September 11, 2001 most Americans had little awareness of the bloody cosmic war 
we were being lured into. This is understandable when one considers, for example, that at the 
time experts in government and academia were operating on the classical paradigm of 
terrorism2 in which we are all political actors, and thus camera time for the cause was the 
main objective. This is not to say that the mostly secularly motivated terrorists in the classical 
era were not lethal; rather, they understood that spilling blood and receiving negative press 
would hinder the accomplishment of their political objectives. 
Sadly, we were too late to realize the paradigm had shifted significantly. Instead of 
mostly secular terrorists who wanted to further their cause through publicity stunts, we were 
and are faced with a new breed: intensely devout, religiously inspired terrorists that are 
engaging in a religious and ethnic genocide in order to fulfill apocalyptic prophecy, hastening 
the final battle of this world and the creation of a new era of life for all of us.3 In short, as the 
global political order evolved, so too did the grievances and ideologies of terrorists.  
Not germane to one specific religion or philosophy, a central philosophy of modern 
terrorists is one in which the current order is so oppressive and hopeless that everything must 
be eliminated and renewed in the eyes of a God ostensibly seeking punishment and 
vengeance before a society built on love, peace and justice can be permanently cemented for 
                                                          
1. Bruce O. Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), Kindle. 
2. Peter R. Neumann, “Old and New Terrorism,” Social Europe: The Journal of the 




the true believers. One need only look at the Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo, as well 
as any of the Islamist oriented groups to include Al Qaeda and its associated movements, as 
well as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, in order to understand that groups on divergent 
ends of the ideological spectrum both seek the same end result: the apocalypse. 
Our situation has been compounded by the moral and intellectual dishonesty spoon 
fed to us on a regular basis by American political leaders, special interest groups, and 
network news talking heads bought and paid for by both sides of the aisle. We were told that 
Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda hated us for any of the following: our constitutionally 
provided freedom; our allegedly special relationship with Israel; our defense of the Saudi 
Kingdom from Saddam Hussein in 1991. As an aside, it is well known that Osama bin Laden 
felt personally slighted by the Saudis over their refusal to allow the fledgling jihadist 
mercenary force he championed, which would become Al Qaeda, to defend the Kingdom. 
Nonetheless, this one specific scenario is not what drove Al Qaeda to conduct 9/11, yet it did 
provide one more grievance for Bin Laden and his cronies to rationalize the global jihad. As 
we can quickly discern, there are elements of truth to all of this, but the composite picture is 
false.4 
The truth is, as the European colonizers faded from history, they left behind a 
hodgepodge of so-called nation-states cobbled together based on political expediency for the 
colonizers. Another way to put it is this: colonized states were apportioned based on certain 
social cleavages endemic to each locale, which enabled an environment of divide and 
conquer to reign, all the while precious commodities were usurped by the colonizers. The end 
result has been a legacy of ethnic and religious hatred, particularly in the Arab Muslim 
                                                          





After World War I, the Ottoman Empire was dismantled, and with it the last vestiges 
of a historical Muslim Caliphate going back to the 7th Century that ultimately stretched from 
Spain to China. Realistically the Ottoman Empire, particularly in its later years, was far from 
a Golden era for the Ummah (global body of Muslim believers), but to have the vanguard of 
all Muslims replaced by a secular Turkish state added insult to injury for Arab Muslims who 
had lost their collective sense of identity on the world stage. During the Cold War, as the 
Capitalists attempted to thwart the Communists, pan-Arabism and Socialism was peddled to 
the masses as a panacea to cure the loss of identity the Ummah had received via the Zionist 
colonizers. Yet this was proven to be a bogus system as well, especially in light of the 
astounding military victories Israel pulled off against its pan-Arab secular opponents time 
and time again. Specifically, the dominance of the Israeli Defense Forces against its Socialist 
Arab enemies combined with the authoritarian state run by Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser 
catalyzed the modern Islamist ideology, often referred to as political Islam.  
Nasser was one of several Arab strongmen that muzzled society and erected police 
states in the name of stamping out the strain of Islamism championed by the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Ironically, the Soviet Union, of all actors, would be responsible for dropping 
the lit match inside the jihadist gas tank of the time. By fostering and eventually invading 
Afghanistan in order to prop up a Communist puppet regime, a centuries old lineage of 
Muslim theological philosophy was acted upon by state and non-state actors throughout the 
Muslim world. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia funded (and eventually the United States), 
recruited, trained and facilitated the infamous Mujahedeen rebels to battle the Godless 
Soviets.  
During this decade long occupation, a Palestinian-born member of the Muslim 
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Brotherhood named Abdullah Azzam, espousing a Salafist-Jihadist prescription for defeating 
the Soviets, invoked an obligation for all able bodied Muslims to travel to Afghanistan and 
wage jihad in defense of the Ummah. Such a defensive jihad was obligatory for all Muslims 
to support in any way they were able to. Mr. Azzam’s message resonated throughout the 
Muslim world, and he soon set up shop in Pakistan where he ran a clearinghouse for 
incoming jihadists to reclaim Afghanistan for the Muslims. 
Soon, this ostensibly defensive jihad would attract a cerebral and pious young Saudi 
named Osama bin Laden. Osama came from a life of decadent wealth and privilege, yet he 
sacrificed all of it in the name of global jihad, quite literally becoming a man without a 
country after crossing the Saudi royal family. First of course, he earned his chops as not only 
a facilitator, but also a combat veteran against the Red Army. At the same time, Azzam, who 
also happened to be his former university professor, mentored him and connected him to the 
Mujahedeen network in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Once the Russian Bear hobbled back 
home, Bin Laden had created a loose network of thousands of militarily experienced 
Muslims who fervently believed the Caliphate should be revived. This should be 
accomplished by first destroying the Far Enemy (America), followed by overthrowing 
apostate regimes in the Muslim world, before finally destroying Israel and liberating 
Jerusalem. This jihad would be waged by Bin Laden’s men in the network, also known as Al 
Qaeda (The Base).5  
After the Afghan jihad had transitioned from a united effort against the Soviets to a 
brutal internecine conflict amongst the various warlords and parties, a troubled young 
Jordanian named Ahmad Fadeel al-Nazal al-Khalayleh, a hard drinking, tattooed street thug 
who became a devout Salafist in prison linked up with Al Qaeda trainers. Though very rough 
                                                          
5. Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda. 
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around the edges, they saw the devotion, intensity and brutality in his eyes and after rotating 
back and forth (not to mention serving more prison time), he would be grudgingly accepted 
by bin Laden as an associate of Al Qaeda, with his own training camp in Herat. This man, 
who took the kunya (war name) of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, would literally change the course 
of history by bringing back Al Qaeda from near death, and unleashing a savage sectarian 
proxy war that was 1,400 years in the making. However, Bin Laden and his lieutenants were 
occupied with the sucker punch they were preparing for America.6 
This, of course, culminated in the above-referenced “Manhattan Raid.” What 
Americans did not, and still largely do not realize is this: we are not dealing with terrorists. 
Rather, we are dealing with a global Muslim jihadist army, full of combat veterans, who live 
a creed that involves mass executions and subjugation of non-Muslims, particularly Western 
civilians, in order to reclaim the Caliphate.7 Not only did this ideology motivate the US 
government to invade and ostensibly destroy Al Qaeda’s lair in Afghanistan, but to also 
fabricate a nexus between these same Salafist-Jihadists and the secular Baathist regime in 
Iraq. This was under the rubric of a Global War on Terrorism. Again the dishonesty is telling: 
a global war waged on a tactic. The US government has never stated the obvious: we are at 
war with Muslim insurgents who will stop at nothing to kill innocent Americans, whether at 
home or abroad. This is not to say that all Muslims are terrorists, or that all terrorists are 
Muslims; rather our current enemy espouses a virulent global ideology bent on ushering in 
the apocalypse. It is, as has been stated so many times by its leaders, a culture of death, rather 
than our culture of life. 
                                                          
6. Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda. 
7. Michael F. Morris, “Al Qaeda as Insurgency,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 39 




The invasion of Iraq was a gift to jihadists the world over. Al Qaeda, from 2001-
2003, really was on the ropes and could have been wiped out completely had the US 
government doubled down on its efforts in Afghanistan. Instead, Operation Iraqi Freedom 
gave jihadists exactly what they wanted: a massive US troop invasion and occupation in one 
of the holiest areas of Islam.8 The result was a horrendous insurgency that was eventually 
reduced to a manageable level, only to be exacerbated by a petty tyrant, acting very much in 
the image of Saddam Hussein himself.  
This set the stage for a seemingly phantom terrorist organization, once considered 
destroyed by the Arab Awakening during the Iraq War, to resurrect and smash the Iraqi 
Army in a matter of weeks. From January to July 2014, what used to be Al Qaeda in Iraq, 
what was once called the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, and what is now simply called the 
Islamic State, fought, consolidated and ruled a stretch of territory from the Turkish-Syrian 
border to the outskirts of Baghdad. This organization, which I will reference as ISIS, 
combined impressive infantry tactics and seasoned military campaign planning, with a 
brilliant yet disgusting information operations (or psychological operations) campaign. The 
end result was a paralyzed public commons. 
Taking advantage of failed states in Syria and Iraq, ISIS did what Al Qaeda only 
dreamed of: using a level of violence unseen even during Operation Iraqi Freedom, it 
intimidated, killed and extorted its way to a declaration of Caliphate. On June 30, 2014 
(nearly 11 years to the day L. Paul Bremer handed sovereignty back to the Iraqi government), 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the emir of ISIS, appeared in Mosul to declare himself Caliph 
Ibrahim I. In turn, he demanded obedience and allegiance from all Muslims, declaring all 
remaining militant groups and nation-states null and void. He also pleaded for skilled 
                                                          
8. Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda. 
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technicians, professionals, and military veterans to make hijrah (emigrate) to the Islamic 
State, in order to consolidate and govern, according to their strict Salafist code.9 
As a result, a tidal wave of foreign fighters has landed in Syria and Iraq to overthrow 
the apostates, execute non-Salafi adherents, and set the stage for an American intervention in 
Dabiq, Syria, whereupon the world as we know it will soon end. The end result: the anti-
Christ will reign until Jesus Christ (known as Isa bin Maryam) descends from Heaven to 
“break the Roman Cross” and usher in a utopian Muslim state of existence.10 The allure to 
potential jihadists is unprecedented and poses a significant risk of “home grown” attacks by 
those who have made hijrah to the Islamic State and returned, or those unable to do so, yet 
unwilling to kill an infidel. One need only look to the ISIS inspired terrorist attacks in 
Australia, France and Canada to realize the strategic messaging power possessed by al-
Baghdadi and company, not to mention the numerous Americans who have been foiled in the 
execution of such plots here at home.  
Additionally, the fusion of hard core Jihadists with skilled ex-Baathist Iraqi soldiers, 
special operators and intelligence assets has imposed on the world a fighting force on par 
with many nation states: highly technologically skilled and determined to usher in the end 
times by whatever means necessary. As the general terrorism paradigm shifted, so has the 
jihadist paradigm shifted. We have seen an evolution of “Bin Ladenism” from infrequent yet 
                                                          
9. Richard Barrett, “The Islamic State,” The Soufan Group, last modified November 
2014, http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-
Nov14.pdf. 





spectacular terrorist attacks, to the absolutely revolting killing machine that is ISIS.11 Aside 
from all of their knowledge, skills and abilities, the most demoralizing aspect is this: foreign 
fighters who made hijrah with their families have showcased their children, young boys often 
between the ages of 7-12, committing online executions of captured Syrian, Iraqi and 
Kurdish fighters. Not only is this despicable, but it is also ensuring that the “Cubs of the 
Caliphate”, as they are called, will spawn an entirely new generation of males who will have 
grown up in this environment, where brutal murder is the norm, and all outsiders deserve to 
convert or die.12 Such dehumanization is arguably beyond the pale of Hitler, Stalin or Pol 
Pot. This poses a multi-generational threat, much like a replicating virus. Each mutation is 
stronger and more virulent than the previous, posing a significant threat to global security, 
American interests, and American citizens. 
Additionally, I would be derelict in my duties as an analyst if I did not address a 
remarkably salient factor: the Sunni-Shia sectarian war going on before our very eyes. The 
conflict between the two will be examined in Chapter I, yet it is crucial to understand that 
Zarqawi, and those who follow in his example, are dead set on starting a war between Sunnis 
and Shias that will not only serve their own organizational purposes, but also as addressed 
above, usher in the apocalypse. That being said, the acrimonious relationship between the 
United States government, the Iranian leadership and their partners in Syria, Lebanon and 
Iraq, is something that must not be ignored. Even if the US-led Coalition, in concert with 
Iraqi led fighters, absolutely destroy ISIS’ leadership and infrastructure, the Sunni-Shia war 
                                                          
11. David Ignatius, “How Osama bin Laden is Winning, Even in Death,” Washington 
Post, last modified April 27, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-osama-
bin-laden-is-winning-even-in-death/2012/04/27/gIQAtTMFmT_story.html. 
12. The Soufan Group, “TSG IntelBrief: The Cubs of the Caliphate,” last modified 
March 12, 2015, http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-the-cubs-of-the-caliphate/. 
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will still be red hot. If the US is not careful, our forces and employees in the region could yet 
again be targeted by Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps formations, or their proxy militias. 
At the end of the day, the enemy of my enemy is still my enemy.  
This thesis will examine the creation and transformation of ISIS and implications for 
global security. Specifically, it will be broken up into five chapters: An examination of the 
Salafist-Islamist ideology within Islam (Chapter I); The significance of the late Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi and the primacy he still holds in ISIS (Chapter II); The political and security 
fallout from America’s 2003 invasion of Iraq (Chapter III); How and why ISIS was able to 
regroup after the Sunni Arab Awakening and American Surge (Chapter IV); How and when 
our conflict with ISIS ends (Chapter V). 
My thesis statement is this: The circumstances that led to the creation of ISIS did not 
occur in a vacuum. Rather, it is the latest segment of a 1,400 year old sectarian war between 
Sunni and Shia Muslims. This has been compounded by the manner in which the Global War 
on Terrorism was prosecuted, particularly with the execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
The resulting social cleavages, which had been camouflaged by the reign of Saddam 
Hussein, reignited centuries old conflicts, which were exacerbated by an inept American 
occupation and an endemic culture of corruption and sectarianism within Iraqi politics. In its 
current form, the dynamics of our battle with ISIS have been overtaken by a power struggle 
between the Iranian Axis of Resistance (Shia) and the Saudi-led Gulf Arab States (Sunni). 
ISIS cannot be truly defeated until the underlying historical, political and social conditions 




THE JIHADIST PHILOSOPHICAL SHIFT WITHIN ISLAM 
The United States is renowned for its martial prowess, toughness, freedom and 
resourcefulness with regard to the profession of arms, as well as life in general. However, we 
are sorely lacking when it comes to situational awareness of emerging and present threats. 
When it comes to the Salafist-Islamists embodied by Al Qaeda and its progeny ISIS, by and 
large as a society and government we are still sorely lacking in a basic understanding of what 
motivates our enemies. This is a completely avoidable and unacceptable situation, and one 
which has and will continue to have deadly consequences, fraught with policy blunders and 
myopic strategic planning. No one will dispute that pre and post 9/11, our enemies have used 
their significant knowledge of American history, culture and motivations to their advantage, 
much like a skilled Judoka or Aikidoka would combine their technical proficiency with the 
momentum of a blundering assailant to emerge victorious. That being said, in order to have a 
fighting chance at mitigating the threat from ISIS and its supporters, we must have a basic 
understanding of the philosophical shift in Islam that began in the 7th century and in 
particular since the 19th century, has been repackaged as a rallying cry against modernity, 
Western civilization and all Muslims who disagree with the austere and brutal lifestyle 
imposed on them by the Salafists.  
The First Sunni Rebellion 
The foundation of the Islamic religion was a truly significant moment in world 
history; not only did the Prophet Mohammed conquer and unite the Arabian peninsula in the 
interests of submission to Allah, but he also set in motion a jealously monolithic religion 
which seeks dominance of the entire world. According to terrorism expert Walid Phares in 
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his book The Coming Revolution: Struggle for Freedom in the Middle East (2010), 
“Mohammed presented the Arabian society, particularly in Mecca, which was the economic 
capital of the Peninsula, as a universal system for faith and society (al Islam deen was 
dawla). The way it was structured, the expansion of the deen (religion) had to be managed, 
organized, and sanctioned by the dawla (state).”1 
The key point from Mr. Phares is this: due to Islam’s place as the third and newest 
Abrahamic religion, it stood to reason that it has replaced Judaism and Christianity, once and 
for all. As Bernard Lewis states in The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (2004), 
“the message was clear. In the Muslim perception, the Jews and later the Christians had gone 
astray and had followed false doctrines. Both religions were therefore superseded, and 
replaced by Islam, the final and perfect revelation in God’s sequence.”2 
This self-declared position of religious primacy necessitated a system for further 
expansion and strength once the Prophet Mohammed was no longer alive to spread the 
message of Islam. This became a reality circa 632 C.E., when Mohammed did indeed pass 
away, leaving his followers and family to map out the future of the young religion. The end 
result was the Caliphate system, which spread its influence and dominance throughout the 
world for thirteen centuries. A key point for Americans to remember is this: Islam is not just 
a religion, but instead is an entire lifestyle that encompasses politics, religion, social mores 
and values. We as a society have become accustomed to a division between religion and 
government, but this is anathema to the Caliphate. Phares sheds more light on this vital point: 
                                                          
1. Walid Phares, “The Missed Century: How the Democratic Revolution Failed 
During the Twentieth Century,” in The Coming Revolution: Struggle for Freedom in the 
Middle East (New York: Pocket Books, 2010), Kindle.  
2. Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (New York: 
Random House, 2004). 
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“In Arabic, the word for successor is Khalifa, or caliph. The institution of the Caliph is al 
Khilafah or the Caliphate. It has two dimensions: The first is the legal and theological 
structure of the Umma’s top spiritual office, which is comparable to the ‘papacy’, 
‘monarchy’, or ‘presidency.’; the second is the entire land and resources covered by the 
authority of the Caliph, as in ‘empire.’ The geopolitical sense of the Caliphate is ‘empire.’ ”3  
The Caliphate ‘empire’, though it was at first led by the Prophet Muhammad’s closest 
friends and advisors, was off to a rough start. This is not to say that the Caliphate was 
unsuccessful; on the contrary, by the 8th century, most of the Middle East, Central and South 
Asia, and even portions of Europe were under the sway of the Caliphate and, “the conquering 
Arab armies were even advancing beyond the Pyrenees into France.”4  
However, of the first four Caliphs (known as the Rightly Guided Caliphs or 
Rashidun), three were either assassinated or killed in battle. This became problematic due to 
the lack of a succession plan being bequeathed to the Ummah by the Prophet Muhammad. 
Instead, the Rashidun were all members of Muhammad’s tribe, the Quraysh, and often times 
close relatives by blood and/or marriage.5 It is with the fourth Caliph, Ali ibn Abu Talib, that 
we turn our attention. His life, or rather the end of his life, was a monumental event in 
Islamic and world history, and would in fact create a grievance that has caused tens of 
thousands of deaths at the hands of Jihadists around the world.  
A Changing of the Guard 
On 19th Ramadan in the year 661 CE, Caliph Ali was assassinated as he led prayers 
                                                          
3. Phares, The Coming Revolution. 
4. Lewis, Crisis of Islam, 34. 
5. “Rightly Guided Caliphs,” in The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, ed. John L. Esposito, 
Oxford Islamic Studies Online, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2018.  
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in Kufa, Iraq. In the crowd of worshippers was an assassin named Abdur Rahman bin 
Muljam, one of the lone survivors of a sect known as the Khawarij, or Renegades.6 The 
motive behind the assassination was wartime revenge. According to Ghaffar Hussain, “a few 
years earlier, in 37 AH (CE 657), Ali had temporarily ended hostilities with his long-time 
rival Muawiyah, through arbitration. As Ali and his army marched back to Kufa, a group of 
12,000 men kept their distance from the main part of the army- they were not happy with the 
way things had ended. They denounced Ali and Muawiyah for accepting arbitration as a 
means of resolving hostilities because in their view, only God could decide such matters.”7 
This aversion to arbitration is something that has become a key tenet of modern Salafist 
philosophy, and has become a main argument in the case of overthrowing apostate regimes. 
As such, the Khawarij coined the rallying cry of “La Hukma Illa Lillah, which means No 
Rule Except by Allah.”8  Eventually, Ali and his army faced down the 12,000 strong 
Khawarij force with overwhelming force at the Battle of Nahrawan in 658 CE. The force was 
so overwhelming in fact, that only nine men from the Khawarij survived the battle. 
 Of course, Abdur Rahman was one of the nine survivors and from that day forward 
made it his goal to avenge the Battle of Nahrawan. As he attacked Caliph Ali from behind 
with a poison tipped sword, Abdur Rahman screamed, “Authority belongs to God, Ali, not to 
you.”9 The end result was a civil war which, according to Walid Phares, “exploded...between 
the ‘partisans’ of Ali [who] became the Shia, and those who opposed them became the 
                                                          
6. Ghaffar Hussain, “A Brief History of Islamism,” Quilliam Foundation, January 1, 
2010, accessed April 15, 2015, http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/publications/free/brief-history-of-islamism.pdf.  
7. Ibid., 1. 




Sunnis.”10 Thus with the thrust of a sword, the Ummah was split between Sunni and Shia, 
consecrating an acrimonious sectarian war for leadership of Islam. This war has endured and 
1,358 years after it began, it has snared America into a street fight amongst Islamists who not 
only want to destroy each other, but also to destroy the West, in order to resurrect the 
Caliphate and dominate the world. 
While the Caliphate was dominated by Sunni Arabs, it became embroiled in 
Christendom’s Crusades, which resulted in an eternal perception by Muslims (in general) that 
the “People of the Book” (Christians and Jews) were bloodthirsty warriors who only wanted 
to dominate and exterminate Muslims and plunder their resources. According to Bernard 
Lewis, by the end of the Crusades, “the jihad had become almost entirely defensive--resisting 
the Reconquest in Spain and Russia, resisting the movements for national self-liberation by 
the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire, and finally, as Muslims see it, defending the 
very heartlands of Islam against infidel attack. This phase has come to be known as 
imperialism.”11 Coinciding with this imperialism, the Caliphate underwent a dramatic shift in 
leadership from Arabs, to Mongols, and eventually power was claimed by Turks, who 
instituted the Ottoman Empire in 1517 CE.12  
The Ottoman Empire would lead the Ummah through World War I, but its political 
decline ushered in an opportunity for Western Colonizers to assist in the degradation and 
destruction of the Caliphate. This clash between largely secular Western modernity and the 
Muslim Caliphate would cause many Muslim philosophers to theorize about how to either 
coexist or repulse the Infidel colonizers. From this, a chain of thinkers from Jamal al-din al-
                                                          
10. Phares, The Coming Revolution 
11. Lewis, Crisis of Islam, 35-36. 
12. Phares, The Coming Revolution. 
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Afghani to Abdullah Azzam would craft an aggressive justification for jihad and global 
dominance, in the name of reversing Western dominance and corruption. However, before 
we examine these men and the ideological and theological lineage whose ideas have been 
adopted by modern day Islamists in their struggle to resurrect the glory days of the earliest 
Muslims, we must first look back to medieval times and address the most significant Muslim 
scholar with regard to the current Salafist trend, Taqi al-din Ibn Taymiyya. 
The Original Salafist 
Taqi al-din Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) was and is a revolutionary figure in Islam. 
Born in 13th century Harran, Syria to a prominent family of Muslim scholars subscribing to 
the Hanbali School of jurisprudence, he followed in the footsteps of his father and 
grandfather and quickly showed his aptitude as a theologian.13 However, it was the 
circumstances of his childhood that cemented his significance as a scholar. To say it was a 
time of strife is an understatement.  
According to LTC James P. Nelson, “The Crusaders had not been fully expelled from 
the region and the effects of Christian thought and western logic were diminishing the 
practice(s) of Islam. The Mongols had all but destroyed Islam in the eastern empire when 
they conquered Baghdad in AD 1258.”14 Additionally, “In Egypt the Mamlukes were in 
power and had consolidated their hold over Syria. Within Muslim society, various Sufi 
orders were spreading beliefs and practices not condoned by orthodox Islam, while the 
orthodox schools of jurisprudence were ineffective in their messages on religious thought and 
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Further, due to the Mongol invasion of his homeland, when he was seven years old 
his family relocated to Damascus, Syria. While his father served as the head of the 
Sukkarayiah Madrasah, Ibn Taymiyyah prodigiously mastered every subject of Islam and the 
Quran. He reportedly also mastered advanced mathematics, Greek philosophy and the 
Hanbali jurisprudence. Due to his status as a master academician, he eventually transcended 
the confines of not only the Hanbali, but also the other three Islamic schools of jurisprudence 
as well, considered a Mujtahid or original thinker.16 In essence, he was a Renaissance man 
above all else. He was also a bold man, willing to speak and act on the convictions of his 
heart. As such, his religious conviction was quite simple: all of life was explained and 
managed by the Quran and the Sunnah.17 This literalist interpretation of Islam left no margin 
for modernity or co-habitation with non-Muslims. Taymiyyah would expound on this 
literalist lifestyle and use it as justification to wage a jihad against the Mongol invaders.  
However, the proposition to wage jihad against the Mongols was quite controversial 
due to the fact that they had recently converted to Islam. According to Christopher Henzel, 
“Ibn Taymiyya reasoned that because the Mongol ruler permitted some aspects of tribal law 
to persist alongside the Islamic Shariah code, the Mongols were apostates to Islam and 
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therefore legitimate targets of jihad.”18 This was a controversial move based on the Quranic 
prohibition of Muslims killing fellow Muslims. Additionally, this could be considered 
precedent for the Takfir ideology that became so popular amongst Abu Musab al-Zarqawi 
and Al Qaeda in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. By invoking Takfir, one Muslim is 
essentially calling out a fellow Muslim and accusing them of not being true Muslims. This is 
what transpired between Taymiyyah and the Mongols, and something that has transpired 
persistently for the last two decades, with the most current example being the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria.  
Nonetheless, Taymiyyah did eventually wage jihad against the Mongol forces and 
became a celebrated figure amongst Muslims of the time and scholars of jurisprudence. 
Though Taymiyyah was focused primarily on his perception of Mongols as apostates, his 
enmity did not end there. Since Islam was perceived to have replaced Judaism and 
Christianity, he was quite angry that they had not abandoned their religion and submitted to 
Islam. Sufi orders also raised his ire, due to the perception that they were mystics and thus 
did not truly believe as true Muslims should.  
Ibn Taymiyyah was a prolific writer, and his ideas made a revolutionary impact 
throughout the Muslim world. Mohammad Ibn Abd al Wahab immersed himself in 
Taymiyyah’s example and essentially focused what would become Wahabbism around the 
core ideas of Taymiyyah. And what were the core ideas that inspired Wahabbism?  
According to former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer, “[Taymiyyah] said jihad was the 
responsibility of each individual when Islam was attacked by non-Muslims, when Muslim 
rulers were ungodly, when they ruled by man-made law rather than Sharia, and when they 
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oppressed their subjects.”19 Steven Simon goes even further by assessing that Taymiyyah 
essentially made jihad the sixth pillar of Islam, elevating “physical combat against 
unbelievers...to the rank of the canonical five pillars of Islam.”20  
The ideas propagated by Ibn Taymiyyah were the catalyst for an ideological and 
theological lineage that begins, as we will see below, in the 19th century and really picked up 
momentum in mid-20th century Egypt when the Muslim Brotherhood incorporated and 
utilized his philosophy. As noted above, Wahabbism which is essentially the state religion of 
Saudi Arabia, is heavily influenced by Taymiyyah. In turn, the Afghan Arabs of the anti-
Soviet jihad would dust off Taymiyyah’s case for compulsory jihad against the “near 
enemy”, eventually transforming into Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda’s “far enemy” concept 
of jihad. Of course, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was a zealous believer in Taymiyyah’s 
philosophy and it is firmly ensconced in the guiding principles of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s 
ISIS.  
Though he did not refer to himself as such, Ibn Taymiyyah could well be considered 
the first Salafist in Muslim philosophy. His strict adherence to the Sunnah and dedication to a 
life in the literal image of the Prophet Mohammad certainly make him a pioneer for modern 
adherents of Salafism, particularly those who use it to legitimize terrorism in the name of 
religion.  
Having examined the significance of Ibn Taymiyyah, we will now delve into the events and 
leaders that encapsulated and preserved his ideas to be consumed by modern Salafist-
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What Was Old Is New Again 
By the early 19th century, European colonizers had by and large infiltrated the 
Ottoman Caliphate. This is highlighted by Napoleon Bonaparte’s arrival and conquering of 
Egypt in 1798.21 Lewis provides a telling vignette of the dominance quickly established by 
Colonial rivals in the Muslim world: “But for a small Western force to invade one of the 
heartlands of Islam was a profound shock. The departure of the French was, in a sense, an 
even greater shock. They were forced to leave Egypt not by the Egyptians, nor by their 
suzerains the Turks, but by a small squadron of the British Royal Navy.” This was, according 
to Lewis “the second bitter lesson the Muslims had to learn: Not only could a Western power 
arrive, invade, and rule at will but only another Western power could get it out.”22 
Eventually, Western colonizers would begin to slowly suffocate Ottoman hegemony and 
sovereignty, from the Levant to the Horn of Africa. As one might imagine, those under 
Colonial rule may not have welcomed such interference. Politics aside, Islam is not amenable 
to loss of power and territory, thus this was quite a traumatic occurrence for the Ummah.  
This ushered in an era of Pan-Islamism “as a form of resistance to European 
colonialism.”23 Specifically, this was championed by Jamal al-din al-Afghani and 
Muhammad Abduh. Afghani (1837-1897) and his student Abduh (1849-1905), “maintained 
that whilst Muslims needed to adopt certain ideas from the West in order to progress, they 
should also formulate a Muslim response to Western cultural and political hegemony.”24 
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Afghani and Abduh, as one may ascertain from their thought processes, were not opposed to 
using logic and rationality, in concert with Islam and modernity. In fact, they were often 
referred to as neo-Mutazilites, a nod to the 8th century Muslim rationalists. They did 
however, “suggest that Muslims should reject the blind following of earlier Muslim 
authorities, whom they accused of deviating from the true message of Islam.”25 Once again 
we are presented with yet another common theme amongst Islamists: the deviation from true 
Islam. This stance that somehow Islam as it was intended to be practiced and administered 
was corrupted, is an idea that would eventually spark the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood 
in the early 20th century.  
Abduh would in turn influence Rashid Rida (1865-1935), the founder of Al Manar 
magazine. Rida recognized that, according to his perception, the Ummah was being held 
back due to European colonization in the Middle East. Specifically, he lamented the “failure 
to achieve progress in science and technology.” He also advocated for a return to the glory 
days of the Rashidun, with a conviction that “these weaknesses could only be surmounted by 
a return to what he saw as ‘true Islam.’ An Islam purged of Pagan and Western influences, as 
practiced by the first generation of Muslims, an Islam that was in tune with the needs of 
modern society.”26 Rida had the opportunity to influence a multitude of young men who 
perceived the Ummah the same way he did. This influence lay in the pages of Al Manar, and 
it just so happened that one Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949) was a devout reader of Rida’s 
publication.27 
It is important to pause and take note of one thing: the gentlemen discussed above 
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(Afghani, Abduh, Rida) are considered the first modern proponents of the Salafist movement, 
known as Salafiyya. Essentially, it references a desire to return to a world and lifestyle 
explicitly modeled on that which occurred during the time which Mohammed and his 
companions blazed the trail for Islam. Al-Bannah is significant because he immersed himself 
in the Salafist philosophy, and created an organization which would ultimately be 
responsible, at least from an ideological standpoint, for the creation of Al Qaeda and ISIS. In 
short, Mr. Bannah’s words and ideas would ultimately shed much blood. The 
uncompromising austerity of Salafism combined with al-Bannah’s virulent anti-Colonialism 
to launch an organization built on jihad and resurrecting the Caliphate.28  
The Muslim Brotherhood, or Ikhwan al-Muslimeen was founded in March 1928 in 
Cairo, Egypt. The motto adopted by al-Bannah and the Brotherhood is quite telling: “God is 
our goal, the Quran is our Constitution, the Prophet is our leader, struggle [jihad] is our way, 
and death in the service of God is the loftiest of our wishes. God is great. God is great.”29 Al-
Bannah was adamant that Islam should not only roll back the onslaught of Western 
Colonization, but it should also conquer the world. Specifically, he stated “It is the nature of 
Islam to dominate, not to be dominated, to impose its law on all nations and to extend its 
power to the entire planet.”30 Again, beginning with the Khawarij in 7th century Arabia, a 
steady and sequential lineage of Sunni Salafist ideology began to fray the nerves of the 
Ummah, slowly raising the heat in the cauldron of anger until it would boil over in global 
violent expression.  
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Yet, until this expression began to happen, we must note one thing: as sobering as the 
early Ikhwan motto was, along with al-Bannah’s statements, he alone is not responsible for 
the willingness to use unadulterated violence in the reclamation of the Caliphate. That honor 
would fall to Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966). Before we assess Mr. Qutb’s relevance to this topic, 
it is only fair to state a truth about the Brotherhood: it did not start out as, nor did it 
completely evolve into, a terrorist organization along the lines of Al Qaeda. While the 
Brotherhood certainly would find itself in the crosshairs of many Arab regimes, it did 
combine Islam with the populist leftist politics popular at the time to organize itself as a 
community building organization.  
In fact, according to Ghaffar Hossain, “over the next two decades, al-Bannah worked 
relentlessly at the grassroots level to establish a complex but structured organization that 
propagated its ideas effectively. The Ikhwan attached itself to, and built strategic relations 
with mosques, welfare associations and neighborhood groups, whilst seeking to influence 
existing activists with its revolutionary ideas. By joining local cells, members could access a 
well-established and well-resourced community of activists who would help them in all 
aspects of their lives. The foundations of what we know as Islamism were being laid.”31 This 
foundation would not only influence the likes of Qutb, but through his example, the likes of 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abdullah Azzam, and Osama bin Laden. Mr. Bin Laden’s reputation 
and influence precedes itself; suffice it to say, al-Bannah and the Salafists could certainly be 
considered the Godfathers of jihad. 
Sayyid Qutb started out as an unlikely jihadist. Prior to his ascendancy in the 
Brotherhood, he was a school teacher in Egypt, and actually spent time in the United States 
on a fellowship to study the American educational system, earning a Master’s degree from 
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the University of Northern Colorado. Upon his return, he wrote a book titled The America I 
Have Seen: In The Scale Of Human Values (1951) in which he expressed his absolute disgust 
at the decadent and decaying American society. Considering the era in which he visited, for 
an American it is rather amusing to read the litany of charges against 1950s American 
society. Nonetheless, this was an important milestone that assisted in his ideological 
transformation. Throughout the book, he credits America with being hardworking and 
resourceful, but lacking of cultural values.  
For example, he observed “when humanity closes the windows to faith in religion, 
faith in art, and faith in spiritual values altogether, there remains no outlet for its energy to be 
expended except in the realm of applied science and labor, or to be dissipated in sensual 
pleasure. And this is where America has ended up after four hundred years.”32  
Eventually Qutb resigned from his position as an educator, and dedicated his life to 
the Brotherhood. After Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser and his compatriots took power in 
Egypt, the Brotherhood was scorned by Nasser and his Pan-Arab duplicity. As would 
become a common tactic, a member of the Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Nasser. In 
return, he and his regime went on the offensive, imprisoning massive amounts of Ikhwan 
members. 
Qutb just so happened to be arrested, and “during his first three year in prison, [Qutb] 
was made to reside in appalling conditions and was routinely beaten and tortured. This, 
however, only strengthened his resolve and conviction that only Islamism could rescue Egypt 
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from the ‘new pharaohs.’ ”33 All in all, he would spend a decade languishing in prison, 
focusing his time on writing and refining his ideological convictions. 
 One of the books that he wrote in prison became, perhaps, the defining work in the 
modern Islamist movement: Milestones (1964) introduced the world to Qutb’s theory of 
Jahiliyyah. Jahiliyyah is the admission that the Ummah and the world writ large had 
descended into a state of ignorance and corruption, much like the pagan tribes that would be 
conquered by the Prophet Muhammad and Islam. With regard to what constitutes a Jahili 
society, Qutb posits “the jahili society is any society other than the Muslim society...any 
society is a jahili society which does not dedicate itself to submission to God alone, in its 
beliefs and ideas in its observances of worship, and in its legal regulations.”34 Qutb uses this 
definition as a basis for declaring the entire world to be in a jahili state, thus ripe for the 
resurrection of the Caliphate.  
He then addresses all of the current Muslim states, by way of informing them of their 
jahili status as well: “their way of life is not based on submission to God alone. Although 
they believe in the Unity of God, still they have relegated the legislative attribute of God to 
others and submit to this authority, and from this authority they derive their systems, their 
traditions and customs, their laws, their values and standards, and almost every practice of 
life.”35 This is quite a fascinating passage because it is very much in tune with the 
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condemnation of Ali by the Khawarijites, in particular his assassin Abdur Rahman. This 
stance of complete aversion to manmade authority or legislation which took prominence in 
the 7th century, was repackaged by Qutb as a rallying cry for overthrowing the apostate 
regimes in the Ummah.  
Qutb continues his thesis by reducing the world into two spheres: the enlightened 
Islamic world, and the knuckle dragging, decadent jahiliyyah world. As such, “there is only 
one place on earth which can be called the home of Islam (Dar-ul-Islam), and it is that place 
where the Islamic state is established and the Shariah is the authority and God’s limits are 
observed, and where all the Muslims administer the affairs of the state with mutual 
consultation. The rest of the world is the home of hostility (Dar-ul-Harb). A Muslim can only 
have two possible relations with Dar-ul-Harb: peace with a contractual agreement, or war. A 
country with which there is a treaty will not be considered the home of Islam.”36  
This simplistic reduction of the world into black and white was and is an insidiously 
threatening idea. This is largely due to the fact that unlike the Shia side of the house, Sunni 
Muslims have no recognized clergy. Thus, a highly influential philosopher like Qutb, though 
not a cleric, can legitimately claim that war be enacted upon non-Muslims, or at the very 
least subjugating religious minorities to 2nd class dhimmi status. This very idea has been 
used by Bin Laden, Zawahiri, Zarqawi, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to legitimize and socialize 
their uber violent, apocalyptic vision for the world. In fact, Qutb proposed a Muslim 
vanguard rise up and eradicate the jahili society.37  
Nasser realized the devastating potential that Qutb’s vision possessed, and after a 
decade of imprisonment, Qutb was convicted of treason and summarily executed in 1966. In 
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the aftermath of his death, many Brothers made a mass exodus to the Arabian Peninsula, 
including his brother Mohammed, who would eventually become a university lecturer in 
Saudi Arabia. He would ensure that his brother’s unpublished works would be have widest 
dissemination, in turn creating an almost mythic cult of personality on behalf of Sayyid that 
goes on to this day. Not only would his colleague Abdullah Azzam make his mark upon the 
world, but Mohammed would have the great honor of mentoring a young Osama bin Laden 
in the ways of Salafiyyah. Thus, Sayyid Qutb’s legacy lives on to this day, through the words 
and deeds of the global jihadist insurgency that we have been engaged with since September 
11th, 2001.  
As impressive and significant as Qutb was, Abdullah Azzam is without question, one 
of the most significant ideologues in modern jihadist history. While his beliefs were very 
much in line with Qutb, he took the idea of jihad and crafted it into a recruiting magnet for 
the Afghan jihad. Aside from this, Azzam was simply a remarkable person. Born and raised 
in the West Bank, the rest of his life was shaped by his experiences growing up in the 
Palestinian territories. A budding Shariah scholar, Azzam went into self-imposed exile after 
the Six Days War of 1967. According to Islamist terrorism expert Thomas Hegghammer, 
“his exile in 1967 made him an aggrieved and rootless ‘citizen of the Islamic world.’ ”38  
Moreover, after resuming his legal studies in Jordan, he soon directly involved 
himself in the anti-Israeli Fedayeen movement. Leaving his young family for the battlefield, 
he spent 1969-1970 in the field with the Jordanian Fedayeen engaging in combat against the 
Israel Defense Forces. This is a significant milestone for him and the movement because it, 
in the parlance of our times, gave him “street cred.” All of the philosophers mentioned in this 
chapter are meaningful to the Salafist movement in their own right, largely through influence 
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via the written and spoken word. Azzam has this as well, but dropping everything to wage 
jihad against the Israelis brings an entirely different level of respect from his fellow jihadists. 
Hegghammer states that “Azzam’s decision to join the Afghan jihad is often described as a 
case of cleric-turned-warrior, but in reality, Azzam had been a warrior before he became a 
cleric.”39 
In order to truly understand just how Azzam changed the perception of jihad, we must 
go straight to the source; Azzam, who had a Doctorate in Shariah (studying and teaching in 
Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia), wrote several books about Islamism. One of his more 
remarkable works, titled Defense of the Muslim Lands: The First Obligation After Iman 
makes a compelling argument for engaging in obligatory offensive jihad against all infidels. 
Within this work, Azzam heavily references quotes from Ibn Taymiyyah, a 13th century 
theologian who demanded a “literal interpretation of scripture” and also denigrated Sufis and 
the invading Mongols, even going so far as to declare fatwas “against them as unbelievers at 
heart despite claims to be Muslim.”40 Thus, Azzam perpetually reinforces the message that 
“the first obligation after iman is the repulsion of the enemy aggressor who assaults the 
religion and the worldly affairs.”41 The primacy of this cannot be overstated. This is the first 
line in the first page of the first chapter for one reason: to underscore the centrality of jihad to 
being a pious believer. Specifically, Iman refers to the basic belief in the tenets of Islam that 
all Muslims profess and ostensibly live by. Thus, performing and living by the five pillars, 
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the Quran, the Sunnah, etc., should be the nucleus of a pious life. However, running the 
infidels out of the former Caliphate is the next most important part of any Muslim’s life. In 
short, jihad is the only way to live a pleasing life to Allah. 
Azzam then introduces the concepts of Fard Kifaya and Fard Ayn. Fard Kifaya, or 
offensive jihad, is not mandatory for all Muslims to engage in. However, it is mandatory for 
some sort of military formation to engage the Kuffar at least once a year. There are a few 
caveats: 1) this only occurs when the Kuffar are not engaging in offensive action against 
Muslims; 2) this is often used to collect jizya (a mandatory tax paid by non-Muslims); 3) 
failure of the Ummah to comply is a sin.42 With regard to Fard Ayn, or defensive jihad, it is 
“the most important of the compulsory duties” and to be clear, it is “compulsory for all.” This 
jihad is executed when one of four conditions is met: “1) If the Kuffar enter a land of the 
Muslims; 2) If the rows meet in battle and they begin to approach each other; 3) If the imam 
calls a person or a people to march forward then they must march; 4) If the Kuffar capture 
and imprison a group of Muslims.”43  
Azzam reiterates the importance of defensive jihad thusly: “If the Kuffar infringe 
upon a hand span of Muslim land, jihad becomes Fard Ayn for its people and for those 
nearby. If they fail to repel the Kuffar due to lack of resources or due to indolence, then the 
Fara’id of jihad spreads to those behind, and carries on spreading in this process, until the 
jihad is Fard Ayn upon the whole earth from the East to the West.”44 He then leverages the 
request for forces in Afghanistan and Palestine into a mandate from God. He makes no secret 
of his preference to wage jihad in Palestine first. However, he admits that Afghanistan would 
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be a better jihad destination for most Muslims. Many justifications for joining the Afghan 
theater are given, but one is of paramount significance: the goal of the Mujahideen is to build 
an Islamic state in Afghanistan; a state which would then be used as a springboard to liberate 
Palestine, and eventually reclaiming the much sought after Caliphate.  
Additionally, the Afghan jihad was considered pure as compared to the Palestinian 
situation which “has been appropriated by a variety of people, of them sincere Muslims, 
communists, nationalists, and modernist Muslims. Together they have hoisted the banner of a 
secular state.”45 It goes without saying that any state not under Shariah is verboten to 
Islamists, hence the intense focus on Afghanistan.  
Azzam did a masterful job of crafting a narrative of obligatory jihad which, though 
defensive in name, was truly offensive due to its status as mandatory for all Muslims, in 
addition to the makeup of the modern international community, in which the Caliphate no 
longer exists and the US military and her allies reside in numerous areas throughout the 
Muslim world. Taking a cue from Qutb, he reminds us that “unfortunately, when we think 
about Islam we think nationalistically. We fail to let our vision pass beyond geographic 
borders that have been drawn up for us by the Kuffar.”46  
This comprehensive argument for advancing the Islamist ideology caught on like 
wildfire amongst the so called Afghan Arabs. Truly, Azzam’s reputation preceded him and 
he became the key jihadist facilitator in the Afghan jihad. Not only was he responsible for the 
astronomical inflow of donor funds to the Mujahideen via his reputation with Gulf Arab 
supporters, but his friendship with Osama bin Laden is something that truly changed the 
course of history. Many would argue, without much opposition, that had he not been 
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assassinated in 1989, Azzam would have eclipsed Bin Laden as the titular head of the global 
jihadist movement. Of course, the two diverged in their targeting philosophy as the years 
went on (near versus far enemy strategy), yet Bin Laden revered Azzam. 
 According to Michael Scheuer, Bin Laden stated in a 1999 Al-Jazirah interview 
“Shaykh Abdallah Azzam, may God have mercy on his soul, is a man worth a nation.”47 
Azzam’s faithful service to the jihad and diligent dissemination of his call to jihad ensured 
that the anti-Soviet jihad received the attention and sacrifice it deserved.  
As alluded to throughout this chapter, the Salafist-Islamist ideologues that we have 
examined have all contributed to the academic body of work that inspired the likes of Ayman 
al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and a litany of lesser known but 
fierce and capable warriors for Allah. That being said, analysis of Islamism would not be 
complete without diving into Wahhabism. 
The Wahhabi Kingdom 
As we have discussed the shifting sands of Islamic philosophy with regard to 
modernity, Western civilization, and jihad, a common theme is a return to simplicity and 
purity. A common thread amongst the Islamists is a society rooted in the 7th or 8th century, a 
lifestyle which is anachronistic and automatically breeds a ‘clash of civilizations’ due to its 
vehement anti-modernity stance. In this case, 18th century Arabia was certainly no stranger 
to such viewpoints. This is because a man named Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-
1792) began a quest in 1744 in which he “launched a campaign of purification and renewal. 
His declared aim was to return to the pure and authentic Islam of the Founder, removing and 
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where necessary destroying all the later accretions and distortions.”48  
Though this puritanical expedition was quite successful, it raised the ire of the 
Ottoman Empire. The Wahhabi movement enjoyed the support of the al-Sauds of Najd, who 
were fully complicit in the domination of Karbala, the Hijaz and the two holy places of 
Mecca and Medina. By 1818 “the Saudi capital was occupied and the Saudi emir sent to 
Istanbul and decapitated.” Surprisingly, the Wahhabi-Saudi nexus was able to improvise, 
adapt and overcome “and from about 1823 another member of the House of Saud was able to 
reconstitute the Saudi principality, with its capital in Riyadh. Once again, the chieftains of 
the House of Saud helped and were helped by the exponents of Wahhabi doctrine.”49  
Abdul Wahab was fanatical in his opposition to the weakened Ummah, which he 
perceived to be caused by apostates. Specifically, “the ire of the Wahhabis as directed not 
primarily against outsiders but against those whom they saw as betraying and degrading 
Islam from within: on the one hand those who attempted any kind of modernizing reform; on 
the other...those whom the Wahhabis saw as corrupting and debasing the true Islamic 
heritage of the Prophet and his Companions.”50 As a result of this viewpoint, non-Wahhabi 
Sunnis, Shia Muslims, Sufis, Pagans, Christians, Jews and anyone who had a differing belief 
system from the Wahhabis was targeted. It is here that we being to see another pattern 
adopted by modern day Islamists: mass casualty violence and physical destruction in the 
name of jihad. According to Bernard Lewis, “wherever they could, they enforced their beliefs 
with the utmost severity and ferocity, demolishing tombs, desecrating what they called false 
and idolatrous holy places, and slaughtering large numbers of men, women, and children who 
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failed to meet their standards of Islamic purity and authenticity.”51 
Eventually the Wahhabis would be used as a proxy force by the British Empire in 
their subterfuge of the Ottoman Empire. After a decade of proxy tribal warfare, Abd al-Aziz 
ibn Saud would conquer and unite Arabia and with it Mecca and Medina. On January 8, 1926 
he proclaimed himself King of the Hijaz and Sultan of Najd and its dependencies.52 
 The Saudi Kingdom codified Wahhabi Islam as the state religion, and eventually, 
thanks to Standard Oil Company, the Saudis would be flooded with oil and oil money. With 
more money than it knew what to do with, the Kingdom found itself in an uncomfortable 
position. The Saudis, but realistically their Wahhabi Ulema, were the face of Islam to the 
world at large, by virtue of maintaining Mecca and Medina. The end result was a global 
proselytizing campaign in which Wahhabi mosques and madrassas proliferated, both in the 
Muslim world and in the West. “Even in Western countries in Europe and America, where 
the public educational systems are good, Wahhabi indoctrination centers may be the only 
form of Islamic education available to new converts and to Muslim parents who wish to give 
their children some grounding in their own inherited religious and cultural tradition. This 
indoctrination is provided in private schools, religious seminars, mosque schools, holiday 
camps and, increasingly, prisons.”53  
To put it another way: the Saudis indoctrinated their subjects with this 
uncompromising and violent version of Islam, and then in order to keep the peace within the 
Kingdom, subsidized every aspect of life in order to keep them happy. Those that were not 
happy were free to found and administer these education centers, which would serve to an 
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entire generation of violent jihadists, both in the Arabian Peninsula and particularly within 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, via the Taliban.  
This phenomena is described by Ghaffar Hussein as the interaction of Wahhabism 
with Islamism. While they may have had different strategies and tactics, they both sought a 
return to the glory days of Islam and the concomitant simplistic and anti-modern lifestyle. As 
the merger proceeded between the “ultra-conservative and puritanical understanding of Islam 
with the socio-political ideology of Islamism would go on to produce the most deadly 
concoction of all-Takfiri jihadism. This form of jihadism made no distinction between 
Muslim and non-Muslim or between civilian and combatant. Whoever disagreed with them 
was an apostate and deserved to be killed.”54  
Hussein is spot on in his analysis of the merger between these two sects of Islam. The 
willingness among those who practice Takfirism to engage in mass slaughters of civilians 
simply for disagreeing with them, is a trademark of ISIS. To be fair, this is something that 
was hardwired into the organization by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi through his Al Qaeda 
precursor to ISIS; nonetheless, it is a practice that has been increasingly carried out in Iraq, 
Syria, Afghanistan and especially in Africa by Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab.  
Putting It All Together 
This chapter was a deep dive into fourteen centuries of Islamic history and the 
resulting philosophical shifts that resulted in: the Sunni-Shia split; Islamism; the decline and 
destruction of the Islamic Caliphate; Wahhabism; the philosophical proponents of Salafist-
Islamism and how they in turn influenced modern jihadists. 
As we have learned, those who seek a return to the Caliphate are doing so through a 
worldview that espouses global domination, the collapse of the modern international order 
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and its nation-state system, overthrowing “apostate” regimes via mass casualty violence and 
insurgency, and mass cleansing on an ethnic and religious level against those who do not 
subscribe to this mindset.  
This ideological and sectarian transformation has motivated Salafist-Islamist terrorists 
to engage in a jihad against the West over the last two decades which has perpetually 
destabilized regional and global security. By waging jihad in places such as Iraq and Syria, 
jihadists have been able to carve out safe zones from which they are able to recover and 
rearm, in the hopes of completely conquering a state or territory, an area which will usher in 
the spread of the Caliphate. ISIS obtained this objective in 2014, by waging a shockingly 
brutal blitzkrieg across Syria and Iraq. We can only defeat such an enemy by understanding 
what their strategic motivations or centers of gravity are. All other considerations aside, the 
Salafist-Islamist ideology, alongside the practice of Takfir, is the core motivation of ISIS. 
Without Islam and the emulation of early Islam, there would be no ISIS.  
By the same token, were it not for the Kharijites, ISIS and its pre-cursor organizations 
would not have lived to kill Shia Muslims, in hopes of sparking an apocalyptic sectarian war. 
It is my hope that this chapter has been clear and informative about the ideological core of 
the threat we face from ISIS and associated movements. Salafist-Islamism is carried by the 
currents of its own momentum, but with a solid understanding of this movement future 
policymakers can more efficiently and effectively craft and execute favorable actions that put 





THE INFLUENCE AND LEGACY OF ABU MUSAB AL-ZARQAWI ON ISIS 
For the last two plus decades, most casual observers would readily identify jihadist 
terrorism with Osama Bin Laden. This, of course, is quite common. In the aftermath of 9/11 
with the global commons searching for answers on how this happened and who did it, a 
spotlight was fixed on Bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri. Osama was often 
referred to as the world’s most hunted man. All of these statements are based in fact, but 
reality and perception are often divergent. This divergence occurred in the immediate 
aftermath of Operation Enduring Freedom, and from 2002-2006, the reality was as follows: 
Bin Laden was still the most well-known jihadist of all time, yet he became more of a 
figurehead for Al Qaeda and its associated movements. On the other hand, Ahmad Fadhil 
Nazzal al-Khalaylah was often an overlooked and shadowy figure, yet he was certainly the 
most dominant and popular jihadist during the peak of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Al-
Khalaylah, who went by the kunya of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was in many ways an 
underdog in life, beaten down by circumstances and terrible life choices, who redeemed 
himself in the name of newfound piety via religion.  
Even during the first years of the Iraq war, Zarqawi was unknown to the world except 
for certain intelligence agencies and his acquaintances. A man with an almost unfathomable 
thirst for brutality and anarchy, he not only momentarily eclipsed Bin Laden on the world 
stage, but also set in motion a wildfire of eschatologically inspired violence throughout the 
Muslim world that would posthumously create the most proficient and intimidating jihadist 
organization the modern world has yet seen.  
How did Zarqawi rise through the jihadist ranks to become Al Qaeda’s leader in Iraq? 
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What was it that inspired him to dedicate his adult life to jihad? Where did he come from? 
How did his ideology destabilize the Muslim world and directly contribute to the creation of 
ISIS? This chapter will focus on answering these questions by focusing on five important 
segments of Zarqawi’s life: 1) Growing up in Zarqa until his first imprisonment in 1984; 2) 
Release from prison and joining the anti-Soviet/Communist jihad in Afghanistan from 1989-
1992; 3) Returning to Jordan in 1993, only to begin serving a lengthy prison sentence from 
1994-1999; 4) Returning to Afghanistan from 1999-2002; 5) Waging a Salafist inspired jihad 
in Iraq from 2002-2006. 
A Thug in Zarqa 
Born October 1966 in Zarqa, Jordan, Zarqawi was raised in a poor and hardnosed 
town by a working class Bedouin family. His father was a retired Jordanian military officer 
and also served as the mayor of Zarqa. Along with ten other siblings, they were part of the 
highly respected Bani Hassan tribe which ironically “has traditionally been a firm supporter 
of Jordan’s Hashemite monarchy.”1 Though it is a fairly large industrial city of just under a 
million citizens, it is distinct for its cultivation of Salafist jihadists. According to journalist 
Mary Anne Weaver, “along with the cities of Irbid and Salt, it has sent the largest number of 
Jordanian volunteers to fight abroad, first in Afghanistan and now in Iraq.”2 Additionally, 
Zarqa is home to the infamous Al-Ruseifah Palestinian refugee camp. It has been said that 
Zarqa has a mosque on every street, and it is not difficult to understand how a majority 
Palestinian population fed up with an ostensibly duplicitous pro-Zionist Hashemite monarchy 
could quickly become radicalized, and in turn radicalize others. That being said, Abu Musab 
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al-Zarqawi was anything but pious as a young man. It was only after his first incarceration 
that he would dedicate himself to Islam. 
Speculative anecdotes abound about his childhood, but the reality is very few really 
know how he grew up. What we do know paints a picture of a troubled young man. Sources 
within Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate (GID) via off the record interviews dished 
out a treasure trove of background information to Mary Anne Weaver in her outstanding 
2006 expose in The Atlantic titled “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.” In 
the article, the intelligence operatives provide several vignettes about the young Zarqawi. For 
example, he was very quick to bully and fight anyone. Also, he was allegedly “a bootlegger 
and a heavy drinker and even, allegedly, a pimp in Zarqa’s underworld. When he was fifteen, 
he participated in a robbery of a relative’s home, during which the relative was killed.”3 He 
apparently had a penchant for tattoos, earning the moniker of “The Green Man” by those who 
knew him.4 
However, arguably the most pivotal point of his life and certainly of his upbringing 
was the death of his father. In 1984 when he was seventeen years old, his father passed away. 
Perhaps for the only time in his life, a man so shadowy that even his closest compatriots 
referred to him as “the stranger,”5 did something perfectly normal and expected in the 
situation: he grieved and rebelled against the loss of his father. 
 Unfortunately, he went down a very dark path that would certainly contribute to his 
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destiny as a hard core Salafist-Jihadist. According to former CIA analyst and now Brookings 
Institute scholar Bruce Riedel, Zarqawi soon dropped out of school and spent most of his 
time at the Al-Ruseifah refugee camp, which as noted above was a petri dish of danger for 
troubled and violent prone young men. Riedel states “turning to alcohol, drugs, and violence, 
he became a petty criminal and a thug. Soon he was arrested and jailed for drug possession 
and sexual assault. In prison he found Islam.”6 
Prison turned out to be both a positive and negative experience for Zarqawi. It was 
positive in that at least momentarily, he was genuinely trying to straighten his life out. This 
was a man who, according to testimony of Huthaifa Azzam (son of legendary jihadist 
Abdullah Azzam), had nearly forty pending criminal charges against him. “It was the 
Tablighi Jamaat [a proselytizing missionary group spread across the Muslim world] who 
convinced him...that it was time to cleanse himself.”7 This is an interesting statement because 
the Tablighi Jamaat could be considered akin to any run of the mill religious organization in 
American correctional facilities; this is to say that it is considered innocuous and in no way 
tied to extremist elements. Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger provide an excellent description of 
Tablighi Jamaat: “it aims at creating better Muslims through ‘spiritual jihad’--good deeds, 
contemplation and proselytizing.”8  
Even Azzam (who facilitated Zarqawi’ first trip to Afghanistan) readily admits that 
“he also wasn’t very religious during that time. In fact, he’d only ‘returned’ to Islam three 
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months before coming to Afghanistan.”9 At first glance, we only see a picture of a young 
man beaten down by life, making penance for his mistakes and trying to start a new, better 
life. Yet as we will see throughout the remainder of his life, everything with him was a 
dichotomy. 
While he may have found religion while incarcerated, he also found trouble. Riedel 
states “like many an inmate, Zarqawi became a more clever and dangerous criminal while in 
jail. He attracted a gang around him and became well known for his brutality, which made 
him an easy convert to extremist jihadism.”10 Nonetheless, he served his sentence and by 
1988 was a free man again. So, what does an allegedly reformed man do with his fresh start? 
Well, let’s be honest for a moment and state the obvious: he didn’t have a lot of prospects 
going for him. Another vignette in Weaver’s article suggests that he was even fired from a 
video tape rental store.11 So, he got married and made arrangements to join the ongoing anti-
Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. We will now turn our attention to the significant milestone that 
was his first experience as a jihadist. 
Becoming an Arab Afghan 
Accounts vary on specific dates and times, but we do know that by December 1989 
Zarqawi was on an aircraft bound for Peshawar, Pakistan. Peshawar was the nexus of 
external Muslim support for the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, with many Muslim non-
governmental organizations providing the gamut of services to the constant wave of new 
volunteers for the jihad. He soon made his way to Khost, Afghanistan where he would 
befriend his future brother-in-law, Salah al-Hami. Although Khost was host to bitter fighting 
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between the various factions vying for power in the wake of Soviet withdrawal, it was not 
combat that Zarqawi initially experienced. According to al-Hami, he had “not been a fighter 
but had tried his hand at being a journalist” working for a publication called “Al-Bonian al 
Marsous.”12 Al-Hami was also a journalist for a different publication, but his firsthand 
experience with Zarqawi is telling. While he would go on to be renowned and reviled for his 
animalistic brutality, the experience using mass media paid dividends for him and future 
organizations he led. As we will discuss later, his skillful use of mass media as a form of 
information operations was groundbreaking in Iraq and is a frightening and powerful legacy 
bequeathed to ISIS. 
Perhaps his most important achievement was, to use an overused phrase, “win friends 
and influence people.”13 It would seem that at least early on, Zarqawi was a likeable person. 
The picture painted by those who knew him loosely resembles someone in the mold of the 
fictional mob boss Tony Soprano in the hit American television series The Sopranos. This is 
to say that though he ended up rubbing elbows with the elites of the jihadist world, Zarqawi 
was a simple if brutish person. Though he seemed to certainly place a lot of loyalty with 
those he did care about. He reportedly even moved his mother temporarily to Peshawar, 
before she became too frail for the conditions.14 Regardless, he built a network of friendships 
with several Al Qaeda associates and facilitators. Testimony from a Jordanian intelligence 
official suggests that Zarqawi attended an Al Qaeda training camp run by military chief 
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Mohammed Atef in Sada, Afghanistan.15 
Aside from gaining valuable basic military training at the camp, he befriended some 
very powerful friends along the way. Huthaifa Azzam alleged that “his primary friendships 
were with the Saudi fighters and others from the Gulf...some of them were millionaires. 
There were even a couple of billionaires.”16 Of course, wealthy Gulf sheikhs are notorious 
for their witting and allegedly unwitting financial support of jihadist terrorist groups and key 
leaders within said groups. As with any paramilitary organization, training, equipping, 
planning and operating cannot happen without adequate financial resources. 
 Though he may not have attained a high level of formal education, Zarqawi was 
cunning and intelligent enough to understand that he would need a network of allies and 
facilitators if he was going to last in the dangerous world he had recently entered. 
Financial resources aside, hands down the most important friendship he would 
develop was with fellow Jordanian Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. An ethnic Palestinian, 
Maqdisi had ties all over the Arab world by virtue of his family’s relocations. Born in Jordan, 
as a child the family made the exodus to Kuwait in order to earn more money and build a 
better life. He went on to earn a secular degree from Mosul University where, according to 
Bruce Riedel, “he was introduced to some Islamic clerics and radical circles.”17 He would 
eventually make his way to Afghanistan as well, where he and Zarqawi struck up a 
relationship. In an ironic twist, Maqdisi’s family was expelled from Kuwait in the aftermath 
of Operation Desert Storm in 1991 (along with the other ethnic Palestinians) and relocated to 
the Al-Ruseifah refugee camp, where in a sense it all started for Zarqawi. Thus things had 
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come full circle.  
Maqdisi was, in the vernacular of our times, a “heavy hitter” in the Salafist-Jihadist 
world. He devoted his life to Salafist scholarship, authoring several publications along the 
way. His most popular and monumental work was published in the 1980s and titled The 
Creed of Abraham, considered “the single most important source of teachings for Salafist 
movements around the world.”18 In particular, Maqdisi “developed the doctrine of loyalty 
and renunciation which called the Muslim faithful to rebel against any government not based 
on Sharia.”19 Maqdisi enlightened his friend about the supremacy of Salafism, mutually 
fueling a desire to take the jihad back to Jordan. Both men loathed the Jordanian monarchy, 
and had eventually formed their own jihadist organization in Afghanistan. Specifically, 
Maqdisi and Zarqawi viewed the Jordanian kingdom as a Zionist puppet, willing to secretly 
do Israel’s dirty work in the Levant. With that, they and their small group of followers grew 
bored with life in Afghanistan returned to Jordan in 1993.  
Fighting the Near Enemy 
Wasting no time upon returning to Jordan, both men hit the ground running in order 
to set the stage for overthrowing the Hashemite monarchy. A fellow friend and jihadist 
named Abu Muntassir Bilah Muhammad claimed that Maqdisi toured the mosque circuit in 
order to spread the Salafist ideology and develop new fighters for the coming jihad. He 
claims Zarqawi asked for tutoring on the Quran. Eventually Abu Muntassir would also be a 
“plank owner” in their new terrorist group. He stated “the idea was there, but it had no 
leadership and no name. First we called it al-Tawhid, then changed the name to Bayat al-
Imam [Allegiance to the Imam]. We were small but enthusiastic--a dozen or so men. Our 
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primary objective, of course, was to overthrow the monarchy and establish an Islamic 
government.”20 
Unfortunately for them, the group was an operational failure. Moreover, even though 
he had quite the criminal background, it turns out Zarqawi was a terrible terrorist mastermind 
at the time. A vignette attributed to a Jordanian intelligence official describes their first 
mission in 1993. As legend has it, Zarqawi dispatched a suicide bomber to destroy an adult 
theater during peak business hours. According to the official, the “bomber became so 
distracted by what was happening on the screen that he forgot about his bomb. It exploded 
and blew off his legs.”21 
Not long after, Jordanian security forces began to pay attention to Bayat al-Imam due 
to Zarqawi’s public denouncements of the monarchy. In another interesting vignette, Bruce 
Riedel details the circumstances that prematurely ended the Jordanian jihad for Zarqawi and 
Maqdisi. “In March 1994 the GID raided his home and discovered an arms cache. Found in 
his bed, Zarqawi pulled a pistol from under his pillow and tried to kill the arresting officer 
but failed, then tried to kill himself but failed there too.”22 Unfortunately for the rest of the 
world, Zarqawi would live to fight another day. 
Shortly thereafter Zarqawi and Maqdisi (allegedly the cache belonged to him) were 
sentenced to 15 years in Jordan’s Swaqa prison. In a 2007 report, Human Rights Watch 
claimed Swaqa prison was notorious for extreme abuse of inmates. One example in particular 
is very compelling: the day after Human Rights Watch interviewed select inmates, “prison 
security staff beat all or nearly all of the more than 2,100 prisoners there. They also shaved 
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the beards and heads of all inmates, including religious men whose beliefs require them to 
keep a beard.”23 One can only imagine that in the mid to late 1990s, the facility was just as 
bad if not worse. One thing is certain: Zarqawi and his friend Maqdisi were not headed to 
summer camp. 
Though Maqdisi may have needed some time to acclimate to the surroundings, by all 
accounts Zarqawi absolutely thrived in Swaqa. They allegedly formed a group in the image 
of Bayat al-Imam in the facility, just as any gang member or criminal worth his salt would. 
As one would expect, Zarqawi psychologically and physically dominated the other inmates. 
This was a pivotal turning point for him in his development as a jihadist. Here he would 
develop the same leadership skills that he used to wage war against seemingly everyone 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Bruce Riedel refers to him as a prison “enforcer...he 
imposed strict rules on his Islamist inmates, forcing them to dress in Afghan style and wear 
beards, pre-approving the books they could read, and forbidding contact with the other 
prisoners.”24 Former inmates at the facility corroborated this to Mary Anne Weaver, stating 
“Islamists flocked to him. He attracted recruits; some joined him out of fascination, others 
out of curiosity, and still others out of fear.”25 
Not one to rest on their laurels, the deadly duo went to work spreading their message 
of jihad outside of the facility as well. Foreshadowing what was to come in Iraq, they used 
the internet to post sermons online. They were able to accomplish this by using sympathetic 
correctional officers to smuggle the sermons to the infamous and well-connected Sheikh Abu 
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Qatadah, “who posted them on the websites of Salafists and jihadists throughout Europe, the 
Middle East and the Persian Gulf.”26 Again this is a prime example of both men leveraging a 
network of well-connected friends to complete the objective. The synergy between the 
scholar and the brawler was dynamic and frightening.  
Though Maqdisi had far more legitimacy in eyes of jihadist elites, inside the prison 
walls the tables had turned. Though Maqdisi was very much respected by all, Zarqawi’s lead 
from the front mentality had, at least in the eyes of his followers, placed him atop the 
leadership chart. Allegedly, some of the smuggled sermons caught the attention of one 
Osama bin Laden, who never met nor heard of Zarqawi during his first stint in Afghanistan.27 
This was corroborated by senior Al Qaeda facilitator Seif al-Adel, who stated that “the al 
Qaeda leadership had paid close attention to Zarqawi’s court case and trial in Jordan.”28  
In a stroke of good fortune, both Maqdisi and Zarqawi would be released from prison 
a decade ahead of schedule. This occurred via a general amnesty issued by King Abdullah II 
upon taking the throne. The King proclaimed the amnesty with the intent that many of the 
inmates would reform their lives with the gesture of goodwill. Unfortunately, this was not the 
case with Zarqawi. He quickly made his way to Afghanistan again, via Pakistan. 
Afghanistan Redux 
Zarqawi entered Afghanistan in December 1999 with a letter of introduction from 
Abu Qatada, the same cleric who posted smuggled sermons on the internet for Maqdisi and 
Zarqawi. He made his way to Kandahar, the heart and soul of the Taliban movement, for a 
face to face meeting with Bin Laden. The meeting was generally successful, with Al Qaeda’s 
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top leaders, along with the Taliban’s Mullah Omar agreeing to set up his own autonomous 
terrorist training camp in Herat, near the Iranian border. Reportedly Mullah Omar gave it his 
blessing with the caveat that “Zarqawi would be in charge of both the camp and its group, 
whose nucleus consisted of Jordanians and Palestinians from Zarqa.”29 Zarqawi christened 
the nascent group as the Army of Greater Syria, later changing it to Monotheism and Jihad.30 
The dynamics of this meeting were allegedly quite contentious and worth delving into. 
The first impression Zarqawi gave Bin Laden could not have gone worse. According 
to Mary Anne Weaver, Bin Laden thought Zarqawi was highly suspect and most likely a 
mole for Jordanian intelligence. “He also disliked al-Zarqawi’s swagger and the green tattoos 
on his left hand, which he reportedly considered un-Islamic. Al-Zarqawi came across to bin 
Laden as aggressively ambitious, abrasive, and overbearing. His hatred of Shiites also 
seemed to bin Laden to be potentially divisive--which, of course, it was.”31 
 As if that wasn’t bad enough, Zarqawi was abrasively unapologetic about his 
statements and even had the nerve to suggest Bin Laden’s support of the Taliban was un-
Islamic.32 It was Saif al-Adel, according to Weaver, who salvaged the meeting for Zarqawi. 
He allegedly interceded with the Bin Laden a Mullah Omar, cementing the details listed 
above.33 
While the events of the meeting may have grown a bit apocryphal, the essence 
provides fantastic foreshadowing of the cleavages that would erupt between Zarqawi and Al 
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Qaeda’s senior leaders during his time in Iraq. The same brash, in-your-face attitude reported 
above was certainly the same one Zarqawi displayed publicly and privately in Iraq. Of 
course, as we will discover later, this attitude went a long way toward catalyzing what would 
become ISIS. Even so, at the end of the day, Zarqawi walked away with his camp and status 
as an associate of Al Qaeda. This was more or less his tryout for the big leagues of jihad, and 
he was reportedly given somewhere between $5,000 and $200,000 in loans to jumpstart his 
new venture.34 
Zarqawi exceeded the admittedly low expectations set for him in Afghanistan. He ran 
a vibrant and successful camp, growing from a few dozen fighters in the beginning to “some 
2,000 to 3,000” by September 11, 2001.35 During his time at Herat, Zarqawi’s Monotheism 
and Jihad group was given a chance to excel by Al Qaeda. As part of the infamous 
Millennium Bombing Plot set to occur on New Year’s Eve of 1999, the group was tasked 
with multiple targets inside Jordan. Monotheism and Jihad already had sleeper cells inside 
Jordan, according to Bruce Riedel, “that collected an arsenal of weapons and explosives for 
simultaneous attacks on a large number of targets on the eve of the millennium, one being the 
Radisson Hotel in Amman.”36 They were reportedly tasked with also attacking the location 
where John the Baptist baptized Jesus Christ and a Byzantine church on Mount Nebo.37 
Though the operation was neutralized before it could happen, Zarqawi would be relatively 
unscathed though he was convicted in absentia by a Jordanian court in 2002.  
According to Weaver, Osama Bin Laden requested Zarqawi take the oath of loyalty 
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(bayat) on “at least five occasions...he also did not believe that either bin Laden or the 
Taliban was serious enough about jihad.”38 Though Zarqawi was often a defiant thorn in Bin 
Laden’s side, he stood with him when it counted. After the 9/11 attacks, Zarqawi remained in 
Herat with his fighters.  
Once Operation Enduring Freedom commenced, Monotheism and Jihad stood their 
ground against the Northern Alliance ground forces and American bombing strikes. 
Eventually Zarqawi would sustain a chest wound courtesy of a US Air Force bomb. He 
would subsequently round up his troops and head for the relative safety of Iran. He would 
eventually make his way to Northern Iraq, where he would soon prepare the way for one of 
the most horrific and sustained displays of savagery and brutality in modern times. 
Iraq: From Obscurity to Sheikh of the Slaughterers 
Zarqawi’s activities post-Herat are a source of contention for the US government. 
Though accounts vary, we do know that by May 2002 Zarqawi had recuperated in Iran with 
the assistance of Saif al Adel, who had made Iran his area of operations. Some would argue 
that Zarqawi conspired with the Iranians and their proxies in Syria to attack the Americans. 
Certainly there is a degree of truth in this, but the significance of what would be his final 
phase in life begins in Iraqi Kurdistan.  
The US government would later allege, while making a case for invading Iraq, that 
Zarqawi was invited to Iraq by Saddam Hussein. Secretary of State Colin Powell would 
allege during his February 5, 2003 speech before the UN Security Council that Zarqawi had 
joined Kurdish terrorist group Ansar al-Islam in order to produce ricin for future attacks. 
Moreover, Secretary Powell alleged that Zarqawi was the kingpin of a global terrorist 
network “operating from Iraq with links in several European countries” for the purpose of 
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producing and distributing chemical and biological weapons.39 The reality was quite 
different. Contrary to the insistence of neoconservative political operatives, Saddam Hussein 
had absolutely nothing to do with Zarqawi. One could almost guarantee that had he been able 
to find and fix his location, Saddam’s intelligence apparatus would have quickly neutralized 
him. Moreover, the ties with Ansar al Islam were spurious at best. “Later analysis has shown 
few ties with this group or its base camp in Kurdistan. The group never mentions him in its 
own propaganda, and his main base of activity was in the Sunni strongholds of Iraq, namely, 
Baghdad and Anbar province.”40 
Unfortunately, the attempt to use Zarqawi as a scapegoat became a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. At the time the allegations were made, the general public had no idea who this 
man was. In reality, he was a low level albeit well connected associate of Al Qaeda, 
conducting independent operations with his own fighters. A Jordanian intelligence officer 
provides a compelling illustration: “The Americans have been patently stupid in all of this. 
They’ve blown Zarqawi so out of proportion that, of course, his prestige has grown. And as a 
result, sleeper cells from all over Europe are coming to join him now.”41 
What the Americans were oblivious to was the tactical brilliance Zarqawi possessed. 
While the Bush administration spent many months checking all of the politically palatable 
boxes and telegraphing the punch way before it was thrown, Zarqawi was doing something 
that was instrumental to the carnage soon to be unleashed. At its core, he was conducting 
what would be referred to in military terms as Advance Force Operations (AFO). 
In Joint Publication 3-05, AFO is defined as “operations conducted to refine the 
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location of specific, identified targets and further develop the operational environment for 
near-term missions.”42 Typically AFO is conducted via clandestine means in order to keep a 
low profile and blend in with the surrounding population. This is a skill set that is taught to 
military personnel in certain career fields, but would be almost unheard of, particularly in 
2002 for someone like Zarqawi to employ it. 
He skillfully crafted an insidious and deadly trap for US forces and practically all 
Iraqis. Zarqawi went about this, according to Bruce Riedel, in the following manner: “safe 
houses were identified, arms and explosives cached, and intelligence networks built for the 
day after the Americans defeated the Baathist enemy. And a network of outside supporters 
was put together in the Arab world and the Muslim diaspora in Western Europe to provide 
money and martyrs for the battle.”43 In a very significant development, Riedel alleges that 
Zarqawi traveled back to Iran “either just before or during the US attack...to meet with his 
established contact, Seif al-Adl...and arrange for the entry of al Qaeda operatives into Iraq 
through Syria.”44 Please, let us take a moment to understand just how pivotal this was. Once 
the Americans invaded Iraq and overthrew the Hussein regime, jihadists flocked there to kill 
infidel soldiers. The primary line of communication, or path of travel, was directly from 
Syria through the Iraqi border. By virtue of Syria’s status as an Iranian proxy, one would 
assess that al-Adel used his contacts with the Iranian regime to finalize the witting support of 
Bashar al-Assad. The flood of fighters from Syria into Iraq resulted in thousands of US and 
Coalition deaths and injuries.  
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Even more startling, as we will discover later, once the Americans left Iraq in 2011, 
these rat lines from Syria were still operating. Once the Arab Spring caught on in Syria, bi-
directional traffic to and from Iraq and Syria enabled ISIS to shatter and embarrass the Iraqi 
army. This is just one of the many painful legacies from Zarqawi’s time in Iraq. 
So, what was the result of such thorough operational preparation of the battlespace? 
Well, it turns out Zarqawi had quite the devious trap set. Specifically, it was a two-step 
concept of operations triggered to execute after the initial invasion. “First, he sought to 
isolate the Americans by driving out all other foreign forces. This was done with systematic 
terrorist attacks, most notably the bombing of the UN headquarters and the Jordanian 
embassy in Baghdad in the summer of 2003.”45 This initial prong of the operation plan was 
very successful. Not only did the UN and practically every other non-governmental 
organization exit stage right, but sadly the UN special envoy to Iraq, Sergio Veiria de Mello 
was also killed in the attack.46 While every conflict zone is full of courageous volunteers, 
both military and civilian, who risk everything to serve others, it is fair to say that the death 
of Sergio put a chilling effect on the pool of potential civilian volunteers.  
In the second prong of the plan, “Zarqawi targeted the fault line in Iraqi political 
society--the Sunni-Shia divide--in order to provoke a civil war among the Iraqi people. His 
goal was clearly to isolate America, then destabilize Iraq and turn it into a quagmire.”47  
In the end, he achieved just what he had set out to do. To prove his determination, ten 
days after the attack on the UN facility, his organization executed an utterly devastating 
attack on the Shia community. Zarqawi’s sent his father-in-law to the Shia shrine in Najaf 
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with a car bomb, where Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim, along with over 100 Shia 
worshippers died in the attack.48 Hakim’s death was so significant because he was the senior 
leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), an Iranian backed 
Shia political organization that was heavily oppressed by Saddam Hussein.  
Zarqawi was relentless in his attacks on the Shia community. He would go on to 
attack “Shia shrines in Najaf and Baghdad in March 2004, in Najaf and Karbala in December 
2004, and in Samarra in February 2006; the Samarra shrine was then struck again in May 
2007.”49 As Zarqawi desired and expected, the Shia sought retribution via private militias 
and the new Iraqi Security Forces which was stacked heavily with Shiite officers. Through 
this two pronged plan, Monotheism and Jihad unleashed absolute carnage on the US-led 
coalition and the Iraqi Shia on a jarring scale. Yet, Zarqawi wasn’t done yet with his display 
of savagery. In May 2004, the terrorist hostage paradigm was violently shifted via the 
videotaped beheading of American contractor Nick Berg. 
In the video, Berg is seated on the floor, wearing an orange prison jumpsuit (a 
symbolic ode to the Abu Ghraib scandal) with his arms restrained behind his back. Five 
terrorists with firearms stand behind Berg, while the central figure dressed in solid black 
reads from a prepared statement. The figure, who would become the executioner, had a large 
knife sheathed in his waist band. After rambling on for a few minutes and threatening 
President Bush and the United States, the executioner (allegedly Zarqawi himself) brandishes 
the knife while the other terrorists hold a writhing Nick Berg on the floor. The video quality 
is (thankfully) quite poor, yet a chilling scream is unleashed by Berg just before Zarqawi 
slashes his throat. He does not stop sawing until Berg’s head is completely removed from the 
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body, at which point the terrorists rejoice and scream “Allahu Akbar” and “Takbir.” The 
video ends with a close-up of Berg’s corpse, the head laying on the back of his prone and still 
restrained body.  
Prior to this event, hostage taking was primarily used as a source of revenue by the 
multitude of insurgent organizations in Iraq. However, Zarqawi did something unheard of: he 
posted the video of Berg’s beheading on the internet. It went viral almost instantly, with 
heavily censored snippets making the headline news around the world. Aside from brutally 
murdering an American, the execution was meant as a symbolic message to the US.  
The message was based on a dangerous new Salafist ideologue named Abu Bakr Naji. 
In 2004, he posted a manual on the internet titled The Management of Savagery. Three stages 
of action are prescribed by Naji: 1) Disruption and Exhaustion; 2) Management of Savagery; 
3) Empowerment. The first stage focuses on destroying enemy centers of gravity, and in 
particular to “damage the economy of enemy powers and demoralize their populations.”50 
The second stage focuses on “carrying out acts of highly visible violence, intended to send a 
message to both allies and enemies.”51 The third stage focuses on using leveraging security 
vacuums into Islamic states, eventually creating a Caliphate.52 
Specifically, Naji focused on using the media as a tool to further the message of jihad 
and Sharia. He deemed the stage of savagery one that, if applied properly, would lead 
directly to the long desired Caliphate. However, “if we fail--we seek refuge with God from 
that--it does not mean an end of the matter. Rather, this failure will lead to an increase in 
                                                          





savagery.”53 In short, Zarqawi was sending a symbolic message via Nick Berg that this 
brutality was just the tip of the iceberg. After saturating the internet and news with the 
beheading, he was standing by for positive atmospherics. If for some reason he didn’t 
perceive a positive result from what was essentially a classic information operation, he would 
find another American to murder even more brutally, until the US capitulated to Zarqawi and 
his followers. In short, he wanted to beat America into utter paranoia and fear via savagery. 
Nick Berg would not be the only victim to such savagery. There were ultimately 
many others who met their end at the hands of Zarqawi. Bruce Riedel describes the impact of 
such violence: “because of his machinations, thousands of innocent Iraqis lost their lives 
simply for being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Within the movement, his extreme 
views gained him the name al Gharib, ‘the stranger’, while one Al Qaeda piece dubbed him 
‘the Sheikh of the Slaughterers.’ For the moment, this savagery worked. It made Zarqawi 
famous and intimidated many in Iraq, especially in the Sunni community. But it would also 
sow the seeds of al Qaeda’s undoing in Iraq.54 
The Beginning of the End 
Since the start of the war in Iraq, Zarqawi had rapidly climbed the jihadist ladder of 
success. Though in the beginning he was only on the periphery of Al Qaeda, he would 
eventually become a company man, so to speak. As noted above, Jund al Sham would 
become Monotheism and Jihad, responsible for the most brutal of Zarqawi’s attacks on 
civilians and the Shia. Though the violence was detested even by many of his fellow 
Salafists, it served a higher purpose for Al Qaeda. With such notoriety, success and massive 
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numbers of dedicated recruits, Bin Laden thought it high time to reward Zarqawi. So, on 
October 17, 2004 pledged bayat to Bin Laden and Al Qaeda and in return he was officially 
named the leader of Al Qaeda’s first franchise organization: Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia.55 
It wasn’t long before Zarqawi fell out of the good graces of Bin Laden and Zawahiri. 
In 2005, a letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Zarqawi was intercepted by American 
intelligence operatives and released by the Director of National Intelligence. The letter was a 
tactful scolding of Zarqawi over his seemingly unquenchable thirst for death and destruction. 
The online beheading videos was a particular source of contention. Even Zarqawi’s former 
compatriot Maqdisi publicly aired his disgust of the rampant use of suicide bombings and 
hostage executions.56 
Zarqawi took a hit in popularity after a 2005 car bombing of the Radisson hotel in 
Amman, Jordan. It just so happened that the majority of victims were attending a wedding 
reception. This infuriated not only the Jordanians, but Al Qaeda’s senior leaders as well. 
Additionally, the February 2006 bombing of the Shiite al Askari mosque in Samarra would 
“unleash a wave of back-and-forth sectarian violence...the attack was widely seen as 
precipitating a full-on civil war that threatened the entire nation, portending massive 
bloodshed to come.”57 
Eventually, Zarqawi’s time came to an end. According to Anthony Celso, his 
“alienation of the Shia, Kurds, Christians, and Iraqi Sunnis contributed to his death.”58 In 
short, he was a wanted man with a $25 million price on his head, and someone dropped a 
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dime on him in order to collect the cash. As a result, on June 7, 2006 two US Air Force F-
16’s dropped two 500 pound bombs on his safe house, where his death was confirmed by US 
Special Operations Forces. His death was celebrated by the US government, and his life was 
eulogized by a coterie of elite jihadists. Yet, the organization he built did not die. It was 
bloodied and nearly destroyed thanks to the Arab Awakening and US Surge, but Al Qaeda in 
Iraq would evolve into the Islamic State of Iraq, which would transform into its current 
iteration of ISIS.  
A Legacy of Destruction 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi revolutionized the modern approach to Salafist inspired jihad. 
He introduced a new level of brutality and savagery, in order to intimidate opponents in all 
corners of the globe. He incorporated the latest in modern mass communications, resulting in 
the “emergence of a virtual jihadesphere linking internet videos, chat rooms, Facebook and 
YouTube activity.”59 Moreover, he ingrained an intense hatred of Shiites, non-Muslims, and 
those who disagree with the Management of Savagery inspired Salafist brand of warfare.  
All of these items, combined with the impressive network of allies and associates he 
cultivated during his life as a jihadist, ensured that ISI and in turn ISIS inherited a turnkey 
terrorist organization capable of simultaneous mass casualties, impressive tactical combat 
skills, and a frightening professional level information operations skillset. The fact that ISIS 
has become a recruiting powerhouse is a direct reflection of the trail that Zarqawi blazed in 
Iraq. In turn, Zarqawi has become an ideological figurehead for ISIS. Specifically, their 
primary apocalyptic quote is attributed to Zarqawi. In September 2004, he reportedly said the 
following in an audio speech: “the spark has been lit here in Iraq and its heat will continue to 
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intensify, until it burns the Crusader armies in Dabiq.”60 
Even in death, Zarqawi has ensured that the spark he referred to will keep burning, 
catalyzing bloodshed and destruction throughout the Muslim world, and even right here in 
the United States of America. Defeating ISIS not only requires understanding the religious 
undercurrents identified in Chapter I, but also the man who is singularly responsible for the 
success and brutality of Baghdadi and company. Once we begin to understand how he 
viewed the world, perhaps this can be applied to ISIS’ centers of gravity. Of course, many 
critical errors occurred in the execution and aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom which 
allowed the precursors to ISIS to survive, incubate and replicate like a deadly virus.  
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OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: PANDORA’S BOX 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the general American public was petrified of 
what was to come. Everyone went to bed on September 10, 2001 thinking that all in all, life 
was good. After all, President Clinton had performed budgetary magic before he left the 
White House, leaving the Federal checking account, as it were, in pretty good shape. All 
President George W. Bush had to do was put the country on auto-pilot and make sure the 
American dream was still attainable. Yet we soon forget that Osama Bin Laden relentlessly 
ramped up his war against American in the late 1990’s, culminating in 9/11.  
As is our cultural heritage, Americans wanted bloody retribution against Bin Laden 
and his lackeys for what they did to 2,977 men and women who were simply going about 
their daily routines. Once it was executed, Operation Enduring Freedom was a smashing 
success, at least up until the Bush administration decided to make an example out of the 
Baathist regime in Baghdad. Many theories abound about what might have been a smashing 
success in Afghanistan, had the US not pulled so many resources away from the fight. Bruce 
Riedel provides a blunt and compelling illustration: “The organization [Al Qaeda] was 
clearly dealt a staggering blow by Operation Enduring Freedom. The imperative in 2002 was 
to finish the job and destroy al Qaeda and the Taliban while they were on the ropes. America 
would be a much safer place today had President George W. Bush continued to relentlessly 
hunt down Osama, Ayman, and Omar.”1 
Of course, Osama would not be brought to justice until May 2011, and Ayman al-
Zawahiri and ostensibly Mullah Omar are still enjoying safe haven somewhere in Pakistan. 
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Yet the United States did indeed rout Saddam Hussein’s army in record time, displace his 
regime, and eventually capture him. At first glance it sounds like a classic success story. As it 
turned out, the decision to overthrow Saddam’s regime was the equivalent of knocking over a 
hornet’s nest. As painful as it is to admit, the blood and treasure expended by America’s best 
and brightest throughout Iraq was all for naught. We managed to, as the popular saying goes, 
snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. As a result of the strategic blunder that the Iraq war 
was, America not only managed to essentially shatter the last secure vestiges of an already 
failing state, but to slice open the scars of a 1,400 year old grudge between Sunni and Shia 
Muslims. Thus, we will now examine the fallout from the invasion and how it left breathing 
room for the remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq to reconstitute itself, paving the way for 
transformation into ISIS. 
The Threat That Wasn’t a Threat 
Great strides have been made throughout the US government, in the aftermath of 
9/11, to streamline bureaucratic organization and process in the name of collaboration and 
unity of effort. Today, even though bureaucracy still abounds, the relationship between the 
Department of Defense and the litany of potential and persistent inter-agency partners is 
quite good. Personnel exchanges, information sharing and thorough planning are more or less 
the norm. Sadly, in the run-up to the Iraq war nothing of the sort happened. Petty personal 
grudges between bureaucratic leaders, military officers and political operatives formed a 
negative synergy in concert with agency-specific information hoarding, often referred to as a 
stovepipe.  
The Bush administration was saturated with neo-conservative policy wonks, many 
who had served President Bush’s father during his years in the White House. The problem 
with this is simple: blinded by ideology, many of these admittedly brilliant scholars and 
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pundits refused to see the blunt reality of social dynamics in Iraq. In a sea of myopic 
advisors, Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith were undoubtedly the two senior advisors most 
responsible for persuading President Bush to invade Iraq. Wolfowitz was the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense at the time of the invasion, and the information he passed in the public 
domain is painful to comprehend but provides a very sobering picture of what was happening 
in Washington.  
For example, he is on record as having stated the following: “It’s hard to conceive 
that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to 
conduct the war itself.”2 He is also known to have said “The oil revenue of that country [Iraq] 
could bring between 50 and 100 billion dollars over the course of the next two or three years. 
We’re dealing with a country that could really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively 
soon.”3 These statements illustrate the lunacy of, with all due respect, having a man with no 
military experience attempting to orchestrate operational and strategic military planning. It is 
sheer folly to think that we could destroy the infrastructure and government organs of a place 
like Iraq and have zero negative consequences.  
Feith also served in the Pentagon as the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. He too 
was a scholar with no military experience, but was widely respected in neocon circles. He 
was praised by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who referred to Feith as “one of the 
most brilliant individuals in government.”4 He is also largely blamed for crafting the 
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narrative of Saddam’s infamous weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program being an 
imminent threat to US national security. When questioned about it a decade later, he shifted 
the blame to the CIA and their reportedly erroneous intelligence sources.5  
As an aside, I find the entire argument of “bad intelligence” to be interesting. As 
someone who sat on a Cold War-era watch floor for nearly four years and scoured 
intelligence reporting of all sorts, it seems disingenuous to say that we just got it wrong. 
Specific details certainly take years to cultivate, depending on location, security environment, 
and source placement. Yet the big picture items that can be detected via national assets are 
not a mystery, yet somehow we flubbed it up on Iraq. 
Nonetheless, it would seem that the decision to invade Iraq was made before the 
evidence was analyzed. In short, the Bush administration was in the position of running a sort 
of political campaign to sell the war, not only to the American public but also to the 
international community whose support in the aftermath of the war would have paid 
immense dividends for the Iraqi people. In September 2003, journalist Mark Danner wrote an 
excellent analytical assessment of the origins and fallout of the war in The New York Review 
of Books. 
 Of the many useful nuggets of information, one of the most vital details the basis for 
invading. In what was considered a bit of “Inside Baseball”, Danner provided three potential 
triggers for executing the invasion, based on comments of administration officials. 
Specifically, “The Bush administration launched its war for three broad reasons: 1) Weapons 
of Mass Destruction; 2) National Security; 3) Regional Transformation.”6 With regard to the 
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WMD, the idea to be sold was straightforward: Saddam allegedly had some sort of WMD 
program which posed an imminent threat to US national security, thus the program had to go. 
When it comes to the National Security argument, Danner makes a bold and 
compelling assessment. Specifically, he suggests the basis for war could be to “remove Iraq 
as a threat to American dominance of the Persian Gulf and to Israel, and make it America’s 
central ally and base in the region” in order to essentially terminate the bilateral security 
relationship we had with Saudi Arabia.7 Certainly this assessment has much truth to it. Let us 
not forget that 15 of the 19 9/11 hijackers were Saudis, and aside from the oil they pump out, 
the relationship is fruitless. In essence, the US military is the muscle that guarantees survival 
of the monarchy, in return for the oil the keeps the global economy humming along. 
Nonetheless, the Regional Transformation is also thought provoking. He quotes then-
National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice who infamously quipped that only when Iraq 
became a democracy would the region no longer “produce ideologies of hatred that lead men 
to fly airplanes into buildings in Washington and New York.”8 
We must also remember that the decision to invade did not happen in a vacuum; 
rather it was codified in the 2002 National Security Strategy and infamously referred to as 
the “Bush Doctrine.” In short, the doctrine is widely labeled as a strategy of pre-emptive war, 
but in this case that is incorrect. Pre-emptive war occurs only when circumstances dictate an 
immediate military response to head off destruction of vital centers of gravity, with one 
example being a potential nuclear first strike against another nuclear armed adversary, when 
the opposing state is actively planning to strike. In the case of Iraq, it was a preventive war. 
A preventive war is waged on perceptions of danger, rather than true danger. Much like when 
                                                          




law enforcement officers are put in the gut wrenching position of shooting what turns out to 
be an unarmed perpetrator, it often occurs in the midst of crisis without knowing the full 
details. In short, it is a frantic attempt to save one’s life or civilization, based on the 
perception an adversary emanates, yet not always based in fact or reality.  
That being said, the Bush Doctrine contains three main triggers: “First, with the 
diffusion of advanced technologies, tyrants are acquiring weapons of mass destruction at a 
perilously rapid rate and, with their help, so will terrorist groups like Al Qaeda; Second, 
tyrants and especially terrorists view mass destruction technologies as weapons of choice 
rather than as weapons of last resort; Third, the old, reactive strategies of containment and 
deterrence are therefore less likely to succeed.”9 
This is a curious basis for national security policy. Sure, it throws around the core 
vernacular of the security studies realm, but we must examine fact: Does Al Qaeda and 
groups like it engage in mass casualty attacks? Yes, but what are their tactics? Most often it 
is either a car bomb, suicide bomber, or simply a small arms attack on a soft target, resulting 
in mass casualties. 
 In the last two decades, the only terrorist group to successfully deploy WMD was the 
Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo, who used Sarin gas on the Tokyo subway in 1995. 
Even then, due to operator error, the death count was quite low, given the potential for mass 
deaths. Yet when we close the loop on the public campaign for war in 2002-2003, Paul 
Wolfowitz provides a sobering account of why the world was sold on the WMD hypothesis. 
It boils down to bureaucracy “because it was the one reason everybody could agree on,”10 
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hence just as Paul Revere sounded the alarm about the advancing British Redcoats, the alarm 
was sounded in America that Saddam or Al Qaeda was about to use Iraqi nuclear missiles to 
rain down hellfire and brimstone on the continental United States.  
As we discovered once the regime was overthrown, the Iraqi WMD program was in 
disarray, if it still existed at all. It was alleged early on that Saddam gave Bashar Assad all of 
his chemical and biological weapons for safekeeping. It is possible that this is true, but 
Saddam Hussein was paranoid, arrogant and proud. He would never hand over his trump card 
against, ironically, invasion. The reality is, he was using the WMD card to counter any 
aggressive designs from Iran. After all, from 1980-88 the two states fought a brutal war to a 
stalemate. In the end, the world was convinced that the threat from Iraq was credible. Based 
on his very long history of violating UN Security Council Resolutions, the general consensus 
was that Saddam’s WMD program had to go.  
Kicking the Hornet’s Nest 
Throughout 2002 and early 2003 US military personnel were staging in Kuwait, 
preparing for the green light to go across the border into Iraq. On February 21, 2002 only one 
month before the war would start, the National Defense University hosted an interagency 
conference to address post-invasion security issues. While the military concept of operations 
had been hashed out for quite some time, life after Saddam was given short shrift. The 
conference was headed by LTG (Ret.) Jay Garner, the man initially tapped to rebuild Iraq 
after the initial invasion. To his dismay, “the group uncovered ‘tons of problems’ including 
gaps in planning, coordination and anticipation of such mission-threatening problems as 
looting and civil unrest.”11 
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As it turns out, the State Department was originally tasked with the post-war security 
planning. At the same time, the Defense Department began crafting its own post-war plans. 
Yet, the DoD made two critical errors in the planning: “one was that American and British 
would inherit a fully functioning modern state, with government ministries, police forces and 
public utilities in working order--a ‘plug and play’ occupation. The second was that the 
resistance would end quickly.”12  
The military was more focused on testing out a light, rapid invasion strategy based on 
the 4th generation of the Revolution in Military Affairs. Essentially Secretary Rumsfeld 
wanted a blitzkrieg style assault on the Iraqi army. “It shortened the war, probably prevented 
many of the disasters the Pentagon had been planning for and saved lives during the takeover 
of Iraq.”13 Yet even CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks admitted the mobility-
based plan resulted in “catastrophic success.”14  
After only three weeks of combat, US forces had routed the Iraqi army and ostensibly 
secured the country. However, this was just the beginning of what would contribute to a 
brutal sectarian insurgency, the political equivalent of knocking over the hornet’s nest. The 
lack of post-war planning was abysmal. “It left large areas of the country and millions of 
Iraqis under no more than nominal allied control, with a force considerably smaller than 
some experts inside and outside the military had warned would be needed to stabilize and 
occupy the country.”15 
Unbeknownst to US officials, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi wasn’t the only one that set a 
                                                          






trap in Iraq for the US military. In fact, Saddam Hussein had left instructions to initiate a 
state of chaos and anarchy in the event of invasion. Iraqi’s were ordered to engage in looting 
and destruction of government facilities, even burning them to the ground.  
This was in addition to ordering the “secret police to sabotage power plants, 
assassinate imams, buy stolen weapons from citizens, and generally create mayhem.”16 Time 
was of the essence and American policy makers were squandering opportunities to shape the 
battlefield and curry favor with the Iraqi population.  
From a purely conventional military standpoint, the Pentagon did a fantastic job of 
creating a plan to defeat the Iraqi military. However, the social dynamics of Iraq were 
overlooked, not to mention the fact that by invading the epicenter of Muslim history and 
culture, Muslims were obligated to engage in a defensive jihad against the US, ironically 
creating a self-fulfilling prophecy of Iraq being a terrorist state. Nonetheless, the strategic 
disconnect in Washington was infecting our efforts in Baghdad. Aside from the previously 
mentioned Iraqi plan for sabotage and anarchy, the Iraqi people had limited patience for the 
security vacuum ushered in by the war. Just when conditions would necessitate a massive 
occupation force, Washington was planning to essentially go home now that the war was 
ostensibly over. According to PBS Frontline’s documentary titled Losing Iraq, “more than 
110,000 troops were told to prepare to leave. A division, about 30,000, would handle Iraq.”17 
Though the lack of troops was a serious strategic error, the man who would 
essentially serve as Washington’s colonial master in Iraq, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, 
authorized the catalyst for the Sunni insurgency. As head of the nascent Coalition Provisional 
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Authority, Bremer was responsible for running the country in the absence of an Iraqi 
government. His role was to rebuild Iraq, nurture a new Iraqi government, and once they 
were ready to take the training wheels off, let them have complete autonomy. Except, it 
didn’t turn out that way. Before leaving Washington, Bremer independently drafted two CPA 
orders that would absolutely destroy the last vestiges of Iraq as we knew it. The order 
dissolved the Ba’ath Party, and as a result, anyone deemed to be a member of the party 
would be considered a criminal and banned from working for the new Iraqi government. This 
included “the top three layers of management in every national government ministry, 
affiliated corporations and other government institutions.”18 In short, all of the experienced 
government administrators who could have kept Iraq from essentially dissolving, were 
blacklisted. The Americans had no clue what they were doing, and the Iraqi people were 
shorted out of a new start.  
Bremer was warned that CPA order 1 would “drive 30,000 to 50,000 Ba’athists 
underground overnight” but he was steadfast in his decision.19 Colonel Thomas Gross was an 
advocate of keeping the Baath party around, and for good reason. “One, the only folks who 
have experience running the government [Ba’athists], so we needed to keep them. Number 
two, the Sunnis need to have a voice. And if you don’t give people a voice, they have 
relatively few options. And what the Middle Eastern history and Middle East--what it tells 
you is their next option is violence.”20 And with that, order number one was the law of the 
land. However, Bremer still wasn’t finished destroying Iraq.  
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It was CPA order number 2 that was the knockout punch. It dissolved the following 
organizations: The Ministries of Defense, Information, Military Affairs; Iraqi Intelligence 
Service; National Security Bureau; Saddam’s Special Guard; Iraqi Army, Air Force, Navy, 
Air Defence Force, Republican Guard, Directorate of Military Intelligence; Saddam 
Fedayeen militia; Ba’ath Party militia.21 The end result: at least half a million angry men with 
combat experience and combat training were without a purpose in life. 
The CPA orders were particularly unfortunate because they were based on our 
experience in Japan and Germany during World War II. Thus, Ba’athists were equivalent to 
Nazi’s and Japanese Imperialists. According to Colonel Gross, “within 72 hours after the 
decision was made, the first major attack from the airport road took place...and it’s been 
downhill from there.”22 And with that, the insurgency was in full motion. 
Cultivating Terrorism 
As discussed in Chapter II, by August 2003, the elaborate trap planned by Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi had been sprung with the triad of car bombings throughout Baghdad. The Sunnis 
in particular were incensed at losing their status in Iraq. Though they are a demographic 
minority, Saddam ensured that the Ba’ath party was stacked with fellow Sunnis, particularly 
those that hailed from his stomping grounds near Tikrit, in the Sunni Triangle. Every day, the 
frequency and intensity of attacks against US forces increased. “By launching paramilitary 
attacks almost daily, the opponents hope to force the Americans to adopt increasingly 
aggressive and intrusive tactics that will further alienate a citizenry already frustrated by their 
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failure to bring order to the country.”23 The blind use of force created even more insurgents, 
resulting in a cauldron of terrorism. Eventually the US military engaged in mass arrests of 
any suspicious looking military aged males in order to gather intelligence. They were initially 
housed at the infamous Abu Ghraib prison. According to Thomas Ricks, “the single biggest 
mistake tactical mistake was to stuff Abu Ghraib with tens of thousands of Iraqis, who may 
have been neutral about the Americans when they went in, but weren’t when they came 
out.”24 Eventually, prisoners would be stockpiled at Camp Bucca, near the Kuwait border. It 
was at Camp Bucca that a deadly nexus between hardline Islamists and experienced Ba’athist 
soldiers and spies would combine to form the seeds of ISIS. 
Even though Saddam would be captured by the end of 2003, the insurgency would 
continue to pick up speed. The US Marines would engage in the most violent urban combat 
since Vietnam in Fallujah, not once but twice. As a result, Anbar province would be a 
magnet for foreign fighters streaming in from Syria and Saudi Arabia. Once the Salafists 
spread their tentacles throughout the province, particularly in Fallujah and Ramadi, they 
would never let go.  
Simultaneously, Zarqawi’s master plan to create a sectarian war against the Shiites 
had 2nd and 3rd order effects that would upset the balance between the Shia and Americans. 
Iran was providing covert support to Moqtada al-Sadr and his Shiite militia in Najaf, the 
Mahdi Army. The US military and Mahdi Army fought an epic battle at Najaf’s Holy 
Mosque in 2004, “dropping bombs literally right next to the shrine and just kind of wiping 
out the Mahdi Army.”25 Instead of neutralizing Sadr and putting down the nascent Shiite 
                                                          
23. Danner, “The New War.” 




insurgency, the Bush administration capitulated to US and Iraqi political concerns, just as he 
had done in Fallujah. Allegedly General George Casey paid off Sadr to stop fighting, to the 
tune of some “$1.2 million buying back some weapons and $330 million more in what were 
called ‘reconstruction funds.’ ”26 The US had managed to simultaneous foster a sectarian 
insurgency with their aggressive and timid reactions to the Sunni and Shiite insurgencies, 
respectively. By coming out swinging, only to back off due to public opinion, the US military 
was shown to be a paper tiger of sorts. The American forces were fierce fighters, but their 
political masters would muzzle them just as they hit their stride. 
The US found itself caught in the middle of a sectarian war 1,400 years in the 
making. Unfortunately, nobody realized this. Even worse, instead of either acquiring the 
resources necessary to crush the insurgency, or alternatively to exit completely, the 
Americans did something even worse: nothing. Rumsfeld ordered Casey to use a “light 
footprint” and this resulted in “war tourism, units based on big, forward operating bases, 
FOBs, going out and doing patrols from Humvees, and then coming back to their base.”27 
As both Sunnis and Shiites massacred each other, Washington realized things were 
falling apart. The metrics for what victory would look like changed, just as the justification 
for continuing the war changed. Scrapping WMDs for democratic revolution, commanders 
on the ground began to realize they could not simply kill their way out of this disastrous 
scenario. Unfortunately, the average Iraqi was living without basic utilities such as consistent 
electricity, running water and garbage disposal, in addition to a total lack of security. Militias 
on each side rose up to protect neighborhoods and tribes. Just as though it seemed the war 
was unwinnable, the tide turned. As noted in Chapter II, Zarqawi’s brutality would blow up 
                                                          




in his face. Eventually, the Sunni Arab tribes in Anbar province would grow tired of living 
under the thumb of Salafist-Jihadists who were interrupting their livelihoods and violating 
their woman. Soon, with the arrival of General David Petraeus, the Sunni tribes would 
combine efforts with a surge of US forces in Baghdad.  
Until then, bodies would continue to stack up all over Iraq. Thousands of US military 
were killed and maimed trying to put a stop to the sectarian violence. However, it was too 
little, too late. By invading Iraq, Washington had opened Pandora’s Box and catalyzed a 
bloody war between Sunni and Shia in a failed state. This war would ebb and flow, but as we 
will examine in Chapter IV, historical Sunni-Shia cleavages endemic to Iraq would be 





FROM DEFEAT TO CALIPHATE 
The story of ISIS really starts around 2005-2006. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was 
incorporated as a franchise of Al Qaeda central, subsequent to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi 
pledging bayat to Osama Bin Laden in October 2004 (see Chapter II). Prior to that, 
Zarqawi’s Monotheism and Jihad organization really ran the table on the US-led coalition 
and Shiites throughout Iraq beginning in August 2003. As a result, the Sunni-Shia civil war 
that Zarqawi so dearly desired became a reality and by 2005-2006 it appeared that the US 
was in danger of losing Iraq in every sense of the meaning to AQI. Just as hopelessness 
pervaded Iraq, a political gamble which coincided with the Sunni Arab “Awakening” 
resulted in what appeared to be a happy and victorious ending. How was it possible for Iraq 
to fall apart so quickly once America pulled out? How did AQI manage to survive near 
extinction, only to come back stronger and deadlier than ever as ISIS?  
This chapter will begin with an examination of the beginning of the end for Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, specifically beginning with the selection of Nouri al-Maliki as Prime Minister 
of Iraq as well as the subsequent political Hail Mary that became known as “The Surge.” As 
time elapses and conditions seemingly improve in Iraq it paved the way for the Obama 
administration to essentially take a knee and run the clock out on the war in 2011. Yet as one 
war ends, it spells the beginning of the birth of ISIS.  
This chapter will also focus on the political and security dynamics in Iraq and 
external factors, specifically in Syria, that ushered in an era of oppression and ruthlessness 
reminiscent of the Ba’athist regime. As the Maliki administration began to lose legitimacy, a 
security vacuum developed which provided much needed breathing room for ISIS to regroup 
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and ultimately to smash the Iraqi Security Forces and completely embarrass Maliki just three 
years later in the summer of 2014. 
A New Iraq and a New Strategy 
Aside from the sectarian war taking place across Iraq, a political war between the two 
sects was also taking place. As previously noted, the Sunnis in Iraq are the demographic 
minority, but until Saddam Hussein was overthrown, they had a stranglehold on political 
power. Once the Ba’athist regime and its military forces were dissolved via CPA directive, it 
was the Shiites who were initially in favor of the occupation. Having been a primary target of 
Hussein’s oppressive intelligence service for so long, the Shia community sensed that now 
was their chance to take control of the circumstances and change their destiny. 
Since Washington was in need of a relatively quick political victory, Paul Bremer and 
his CPA were working on a truncated timeline, and on June 30, 2004 “sovereignty” (and I 
use the term very loosely) was handed over to an interim Iraqi caretaker government, with 
national parliamentary elections being held in January 2005. Feeling collectively 
marginalized after Fallujah was effectively flattened after the second battle, by and large the 
Sunni population boycotted participating in the elections. Clearly this was not the proper 
course of action if they were looking to use the political process to recoup their status as 
political hegemon. It goes without saying that the Shiites dominated the elections. 
Anthony Cordesman sums up the situation by stating “we’d elected a government that 
divided the country...beneath this political structure, there was a virtual vacuum.”1 In the end, 
two sign cant events occurred that turned the political tide.  
The first was the election of Nouri al-Maliki as Prime Minister in May 2006. The 
second was the decision to send 20,000 additional troops to Iraq in 2007, as part of “The 
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Surge” to protect the population from attack.2 General David Petraeus summed up his 
strategy as “we are going to take away from Al Qaeda, Sunni insurgents on one hand, and 
then Shia militia extremists on the others, in the areas in which they operate. We are going to 
fight them.”3 
The fighting and friendly casualties would spike upward before improving. Domestic 
and international political spotlights shone on the Bush administration. Soon, Bush’s 
National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley, received some troubling intelligence about 
Prime Minister Maliki. Soon, he drafted a report detailing Maliki’s use of sectarian politics as 
a tactic to gain power. “Reports of nondelivery of services to Sunni areas, removal of Iraq’s 
most effective commanders on a sectarian basis and efforts to ensure Shia majorities in all 
ministries, all suggest a campaign to consolidate Shia power in Baghdad.”4 Sectarian 
partisanship would ultimately be the downfall of Maliki and the façade that was the Iraqi 
Security Forces, but not until 2014. Until then, Washington and in particular President Bush 
gave Maliki a renewed vote of confidence.5 
While the Surge was certainly an important factor in turning around the security 
situation in Iraq, the casual observer often makes a mistake by assuming that the US military 
single handedly crushed AQI and the other insurgent groups independently. To be sure, the 
US military engaged in very intense combat, bolstered by a streamlined, experienced and 
improved intelligence fusion process across the theater. However, the most important factor 
in turning around Iraq was the so called Sunni Awakening. Over 103,000 Sunni tribal 
                                                          






fighters, dubbed the ‘Sons of Iraq’ were responsible for decreasing insurgent attacks by 90 
percent.6  
General (Ret.) Jack Keane, known as the man who suggested the Surge policy to 
President Bush, had a very favorable perception of the dividends paid by the Surge. “By the 
end of 2008, clearly, the al Qaeda and Sunni insurgency had been relatively stabilized. And 
in the al Qaeda’s mind, they were defeated. They actually said that in many of their 
transmissions that we were able to pick up. And the Shia militia, largely those trained by the 
Iranians in Basra and also in Sadr City, had been defeated.”7 Before leaving office in 2008, 
President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki agreed to keep US forces in Iraq until 2011, with 
the option for President Obama to extend them even further.  
In a hurry to fulfill campaign promises and put a contentious and often brutal guerilla 
war behind him, President Obama began to downsize the footprint in Iraq, with an eye 
toward leaving Iraq by 2011. In early 2009 at in a speech at Camp Lejeune, NC, President 
Obama announced that the US would have a zero troop level in Iraq at the end of 2011.8 In 
the course of the drawdown, the Obama administration became very much detached from day 
to day developments in Iraq. According to General Keane, “we were no longer attempting to 
shape and guide their political maturation. Huge mistake.”9 Much like a child left 
unsupervised by a parental authority figure, Prime Minister Maliki began to do whatever he 
pleased, as long as it gave him personal and political benefit.  
Maliki began to cannibalize the military and intelligence services, replacing the 
                                                          






professionals with his Shiite partisans. It would appear, according to Thomas Ricks, “as if 
he’s more worried about a coup than he is in having an effective military because what good 
is an effective military if it’s against you.”10 The paranoia and fear of being overthrown 
harken back to the reign of Saddam Hussein. Then again, modern Iraqi political leaders tend 
to get displaced quite easily, unless they employ brutally oppressive security forces to keep 
any potential challengers out of the picture. Additionally, Maliki began to turn on the Sunni 
Awakening fighters. Originally promised a paycheck and a place in the military by Petraeus, 
Maliki began to renege on the deal once the Americans began to take their eye off the ball. 
“He began to take exception to the Sons of Iraq, which all came from the Sunni tribes. He 
stopped paying them. Not only that, he began to purge some of them and actually attacked 
and killed some of them.”11 
Eventually the clock would strike midnight on the proposed 2011 withdrawal date. Perceived 
to be dragging his feet on the situation, Obama and Maliki got down to brass tacks but could 
not come to an agreement on a post-2011 troop presence. Thus, on December 14, 2011 “after 
nearly nine years, over 4,000 Americans killed, more than 30,000 wounded and an estimated 
cost of $2 trillion, the last US troops left Iraq.”12 Physically and politically isolated, Maliki 
took his reorganized and Shiite dominated military and began an oppressive campaign 
against the Sunni population. Yet again, he was acting more and more like the dictator the 
Americans had sacrificed so much to get rid of. 
The Many Faces of Al-Qaeda 
Iraqi politicians weren’t the only ones transforming themselves in the new Iraq. Even 
                                                          





before the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, AQI was also in a perpetual state of transition. 
According to terrorism expert Charles Lister of the Brookings Institute, “AQI’s sustained 
prominence continued to attract the support--whether ideological or pragmatic--of other Iraq-
based insurgent groups.”13 On January 15, 2006 AQI announced that it was merging with 
five other jihadist organizations to form what was known as the Mujahideen Shura Council 
(MSC), alternatively known as the Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen (MSM).14 Not long after 
Zarqawi was killed in an airstrike in June 2006, the MSC/MSM would transform yet again.  
Five days after Zarqawi’s death, according to Lister, “AQI appointed Abu Hamza al-
Muhajir (Abu Ayyub al-Masri) as its new leader, and four months later the MSM announced 
the establishment of...the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), with a fully structured cabinet. Then, on 
November 10, Masri pledged bay’a (allegiance) to ISI leader Hamid Dawud Muhammad 
Khalil al-Zawi (Abu Omar al-Baghdadi).”15 This passage is loaded with items of utmost 
importance for the future. First, we see for the first time the public transformation of AQI 
from a ‘terrorist group’ to a self-professed Islamic State. It’s important to understand why 
this happened. First, even while he was being publicly reprimanded by Zawahiri, Zarqawi 
was instructed to carve out a safe zone in order to serve as an emirate or state from which to 
create a Caliphate. Second, this is also in line with Abu Bakr Naji’s policy playbook in The 
Management of Savagery. Taking advantage of the security vacuum, AQI/ISI began to carve 
out spheres of influence to serve as future safe havens.  
                                                          
13. Charles Lister, “Profiling The Islamic State,” Brookings Institute, November 1, 
2014, accessed July 2, 2015, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/11/profiling islamic state 
lister/en_web_lister.pdf. 
14. Ibid., 8. 
15. Lister, “Profiling The Islamic State,” 8. 
  
78 
Another item of extreme importance in the above passage is the reference to bayat. 
As discussed in Chapter II, Zarqawi adamantly refused on at least five occasions to pledge 
bayat to Bin Laden while in Afghanistan. It was only in 2004 that he did so, in return for 
being named emir of AQI. However, when Zarqawi passed away, so did the loyalty his 
organization vowed to provide Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. According to Charles Lister, 
“Masri’s pledge of allegiance to ISI combined with the lack of any formal ISI pledge of 
allegiance to al-Qaeda catalyzed a gradual divorce between the two entities. Through the late 
2000s, al-Qaeda remained determined that ISI continue as its subordinate by ordering it to 
attack specific targets, but by 2010-2011, the relationship had eroded significantly.”16 As 
such, ISI was free from the ideological constructs of Al Qaeda central, and would eventually 
choose to go its own way. 
Lister alerts us to more significant changes to go along with the pronouncement of 
ISI. Since it was now, nominally and subjectively, a state in the Westphalian sense it needed 
a professional military and a governing body.  
It had even accumulated a very successful treasury by 2006, “raising $70-200 million 
per year through a combination of ransoms, extortion, and oil smuggling.”17  Unfortunately 
for ISI, the experiment in governing was not as successful as their entrepreneurial activities. 
“ISI proved unwilling to compromise its absolutist ideology. Where it attempted to govern, 
communities ended up opposing their presence. Put simply, ISI overestimated its capacity to 
engender Sunni support and overstretched its forces, leaving them vulnerable to what was 
coming.”18 
                                                          





When the Sunni Arab tribes rose up as part of the Sunni Awakening or Sahwa, it 
created a big problem for ISI. Threatened by the US-backed Sunni fighters, ISI ramped up 
the violence by slaughtering over 800 Yazidi villagers on August 14, 2007.19 They also 
managed to kill the tribal leader of the Sunni Awakening, though it had no significant 
operational impact on the tribal fighters. If anything, it simply motivated them to work harder 
to eradicate ISI.20 According to Lister, “the proliferation of ISI enemies meant that by 2008 
the group was under extreme pressure in Iraq. Many of its foreign fighters left the country 
and sectarian violence decreased measurably.”21 
 Complementary to an extremely high ops tempo of American Special Operations 
Forces raids against ISI leaders and fighters, the Sons of Iraq managed to keep ISI off 
balance and largely out of the fight. The general consensus appeared to be that ISI was nearly 
wiped from the Earth’s face. 
However, ISI had a will to survive and leadership began to transition to a defensive 
posture. Lister alleges that even by “early 2008, ISI began--with impressive speed--extensive 
structural reforms whereby it ‘devolved’ back into a typical ‘terrorist’ group.”22 With this 
devolution, we can begin to recognize patterns and developments that are quite familiar, 
because they are still used by ISIS today. As Lister tells us, “one particularly significant 
decision was to shift ISI’s headquarters to the northern city of Mosul, where existing Arab-
Kurdish tensions could be exploited.”23 In Mosul, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and two deputies 
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managed the Iraq-wide insurgency, and governors in each province responsible for 
“operational planning and an enhanced focus on income generation.”24 Again, this structure 
is one that endures to current times for ISIS.  
Not one to let a good crisis go to waste, ISI capitalized on Maliki’s growing 
sectarianism and paranoia to poach Sunni tribal fighters from the Sons of Iraq. According to 
Lister, “by mid-2010 ISI was offering larger salaries than the government and recruiting 
Sahwa members.”25 Although ISI was on the comeback trail, killing nearly 400 people in a 
three month stretch of 2009 in Baghdad, the organization took another uppercut to the chin.26 
On April 18, 2010 a joint US-Iraqi raid killed both Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayyub 
al-Masri.27 The man who took the helm after their deaths, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi would put 
the finishing touches on the powerhouse that was to become ISIS.  
After he took charge, ISI became, according to Charles Lister, much more Iraqi-
centric. “ISI had become far more Iraqi in terms of its membership. This improved its social 
grounding, and operations at the provincial and local levels were designed with community 
dynamics in mind. It also gave ISI an enhanced ability to acquire intelligence sources within 
the Iraqi security apparatus--something it has since exploited extensively.”28 Just as we saw 
Zarqawi conduct Advance Force Operations in order to shape the battlefield and prep target 
sites prior to the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Baghdadi and company were shaping 
the battlefield via enhanced intelligence collection, information operations and key leader 
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engagements. This was a military formation preparing to assault an objective, or several 
objectives.  
Another Civil War? 
The sectarian powder keg Maliki was sitting atop finally exploded in 2012. 
According to Sinan Adnan and Aaron Reese from the Institute for the Study of War, “Sunni 
popular resentment finally boiled over on December 20, 2012, after Prime Minister Maliki 
arrested the bodyguards of Sunni Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi in a targeted move meant to 
sideline Maliki’s political rivals.”29 In a matter of “weeks, large-scale protests had spread 
across the Sunni-dominated provinces of Anbar, Salah ad-Din, Ninewa, Kirkuk, and Diyala, 
as well as in Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad.”30 The protests spawned large camps in 
which the protestors congregated. One of those camps was located in Hawija, near Kirkuk. 
On April 23, 2013, “Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) stormed a protest camp and opened fire, 
killing 20 Sunni protestors and wounding over 100 others.”31 The Sunni population revolted 
against Maliki and his ISF, paving the way for Sunni and Shia militias that were prevalent at 
the height of Operation Iraqi Freedom, to re-activate and defend their respective populations 
from the anticipated sectarian war. 
Aside from Maliki’s draconian use of his praetorian guard to massacre Sunni 
protestors, we must also note another important dynamic that was instrumental in the 
formation of ISIS: the Syrian Civil War. In early 2011, the alleged Arab Spring that was 
taking the Middle East by storm had impacted nearly every state in the region, with the 
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exception of Syria. However, by mid-March 2011, Syria would be under siege. It all started 
on March 15, 2011, when a minor protest in Daraa was put down violently by the Assad 
regime. In response, practically all of Syria experienced anti-regime protests and riots, which 
catalyzed a war between the protestors and the regime.32 In the midst of civil chaos, radical 
Islamists from around the Muslim world made their way to Syria in order to overthrow the 
Assad regime.  
As mentioned in previous chapters, Zarqawi had paved the way, via Seif al Adl’s 
Iranian connections, to open dedicated transit routes or lines of communication from Syria 
through Iraq in preparation for the anti-American/anti-Shiite jihad. Additionally, according to 
Charles Lister, it has been estimated that “85-90% of foreign fighters in Iraq had come via 
Syria.”33 
 Interestingly enough, despite the long-standing logistical ties to Syria, Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi thought the war in Syria was a “distraction from its Iraq-centric campaign and they 
forbade even their Syrian followers from joining the rebellion.”34  
Eventually in mid-2011 Baghdadi eased up and permitted Ninewa operations chief 
Abu Mohammad al Golani to start a franchise or affiliate of ISIS inside Syria.35 The decision 
to send Golani to Syria had monumental consequences in the jihadist world, resulting in a 
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bitter clash between Al Qaeda and ISI. 
Divorcing Al-Qaeda and Breaking the Walls 
Golani’s nascent organization, Jabhat-al-Nusra (also referred to as JN or the Al Nusra 
Front), was ostensibly an arm of ISI but in reality was totally autonomous. Nusra had a rocky 
start due to its initial focus on killing civilians, but once it recalibrated and solely focused on 
targeting regime forces, it made impressive strides. “By mid-January 2013, Jabhat al-Nusra 
had led the seizure of two major military facilities in Northern Syria...and cemented its 
reputation as a valued member in the fight against the government.”36 As Richard Barrett of 
The Soufan Group points out, JN and the war in Syria “went viral, attracting thousands of 
fighters from around the globe and completely eclipsing the insurgency in Iraq.”37 The 
publicity was too much for Baghdadi, who announced on April 9, 2013 the formation of the 
Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS), of which Nusra was now a subordinate organ.38 Golani 
quickly denied the annexation and proclaimed his independence. Each side continued to 
ignore the proclamations of the other. Eventually Golani sent it up the jihadist chain of 
command for arbitration by the one and only Ayman al-Zawahiri, now the head of Al Qaeda 
after the death of Bin Laden. 
This appellate process would create bad blood between Al Qaeda and ISIS. In a 
circumstance reminiscent of the 2005 letters of admonishment from Zawahiri to Bin Laden, 
Zawahiri repeatedly ordered Baghdadi to back off and let the Nusra Front operate in Syria 
independently. Each time Baghdadi, much like Zarqawi would have done, completely 
ignored the guidance from Zawahiri. This forced his hand, and in February 2014, Zawahiri 
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essentially excommunicated ISIS from Al Qaeda.39 In a fit of spiteful rage, Baghdadi created 
a new ISIS affiliate in Syria from Nusra fighters that he poached from Golani. According to 
Charles Lister, “this new Syria-based ISIS force began aggressively expanding across 
northern and eastern Syria. This quickly prompted opposition; while Jabhat al-Nusra shared 
power and governance, ISIS demanded complete control over society.”40 The Syria branch of 
ISIS would go on to engage in a battle royal against practically every rebel group in Northern 
Syria, in addition to regime forces. Having suffered moderately heavy losses from the 
infighting, ISIS dropped anchor in Raqqa, Syria where it would establish its headquarters.41 
In the meantime, ISIS launched two extremely effective and creative military 
operations against the Iraqi Security Forces. The first mission, designed to last 12 months, 
commenced in July 2012 and was called Breaking the Walls because it was a campaign 
designed to literally break prison walls and rescue skilled fighters who were often on death 
row. According to Charles Lister, “ISI launched eight major attacks on Iraqi prisons over the 
following year. The September 2012 attack on Tikrit’s Tasfirat Prison liberated 47 senior ISI 
leaders from death row. The campaign’s finale was an assault on Abu Ghraib prison on July 
21, 2013 that enabled approximately 500 prisoners to escape.”42 
The second mission was called Soldier’s Harvest and was supposed to run 12 months 
as well. In a brutal display of leveraging clandestine intelligence collection to conduct 
sensitive kinetic action, it “aimed to undermine the capacity and confidence of security forces 
through targeted attacks and intimidation. It entailed a 150% increase in ‘close-quarters 
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assassinations’ of security personnel and threats directed at individual commanders, soldiers, 
and police, including the bombing of their homes, drive-by shootings against their 
checkpoints and personal vehicles, and similar targeted attacks.”43 
The two 12-month campaigns in Iraq were particularly effective at gaining skilled 
personnel and destroying the will of the Iraqi Security Forces to fight. With a pool of 
committed and battle-experienced jihadists, the neutralization of security personnel would 
also provide a buffer for ISIS to expand its area of operations. Moreover, consolidating and 
maintaining a headquarters at Raqqa was a brilliant move. With an Iraqi headquarters in 
Mosul and a Syrian headquarters in Raqqa, ISIS could effectively neutralize the border 
separating Syria and Iraq, setting the stage for a declaration of Caliphate. 
Taking advantage of the Sunni uprising in Iraq, ISIS was able to completely overrun Fallujah 
in January 2014, in addition to partially taking Ramadi at the same time.44 Afterwards, Deir 
Ezzour, Syria was the site of an anti-rebel ISIS campaign, largely taken in order to get 
retribution over al Nusra and various other groups that attacked ISIS in the early days of 
Syria. “ISIS’s operations in Iraq and Syria were becoming increasingly interrelated, with 
funds, fighters and weapons crossing borders more frequently. It was under this emerging 
reality that led the rapid seizure of Mosul on June 10, thereby inflaming the wider Sunni 
armed uprising across Iraq.”45 
Caliphate 
The conquering of Mosul was particularly impressive. During the PBS Frontline 
documentary Rise of ISIS, host Martin Smith remarked that it “only took 800 ISIS militants, 
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with the help of local Baathist military cadres, to secure a city of 1.8 million people. Even 
ISIS was surprised.”46 Mosul was a particularly lucrative target due to all of the US-supplied 
military hardware that was recovered from the Iraqi military. Former US envoy in Iraq, Ali 
Khedery, makes a very compelling argument about the impact of Mosul: “I don’t think Bin 
Laden could’ve ever dreamt that elements even more radical than his own al Qaeda would be 
armed with American M1-A1 tanks or 155-millimeter artillery or up-armored Humvees or 
MRAPS.”47 Indeed, ISIS had better military resources than many nation-states in the 
aftermath of the 2014 Mosul offensive.  
On June 29, 2014 an announcement coinciding with the start of Ramadan proclaimed 
the creation of the Caliphate on behalf of ISIS. They also used a bulldozer to destroy the 
defensive berm between Syria and Iraq, thus proclaiming “the end of Sykes-Picot” and the 
borders and states demarcated under the terms of Sykes-Picot.48 On July 4, 2014 at the Grand 
Mosque of al Nuri in Mosul, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi preached a sermon and publicly declared 
the establishment of the Caliphate, dropping Iraq and Syria from the organization’s name, 
now known simply as the Islamic State.49 
This was a bold move, provoking yet another conflict with Al Qaeda and its 
supporters. Since Al Qaeda has traditionally pledged bayat to Taliban leader Mullah 
Mohammad Omar, who proclaimed himself Amir al Mu’minin or Commander of the 
Faithful, in the late 1990s, it was clear that they would take issue with the proclamation of 
Caliphate. Moreover, in his role as Caliph Ibrahim I, Baghdadi was obligated to declare all 
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rival jihadist groups and nation-states null and void. He also encouraged Muslims with 
technical and administrative skills to come to the Islamic State in order to assist in governing 
the citizens of the Caliphate. In the example of Ibn Taymiyya, Baghdadi was making very 
bold moves in order to establish and solidify the Caliphate.  
ISIS continued to press its offensive throughout Northern Iraq and Syria in 2014. Due 
to the unique composition of ISIS, that is to say part-Baathist soldier and part-Salafist-
jihadist, the group is a formidable opponent on the battlefield, particularly as it continues to 
acquire hardware from the hapless Iraqi Security Forces. As ISIS battled Kurdish forces on 
both sides of the border to a stalemate, particularly around the wheat-laden town of Kobane, 
it appeared more likely that the United States would need to get involved militarily. 
By August 2014, ISIS initiated a brutal information operations campaign in which 
American and British hostages were beheaded on videotape and posted on the internet, just 
as Zarqawi had done a decade earlier.  
The videos coincided with the commencement of Operation Inherent Resolve, an 
open ended air campaign led by the US that seeks to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIS, in 
collaboration with Iraqi and Kurdish ground force movements. Additionally, the US began to 
deploy special operators and Marines to Iraq in order to re-train the Iraqi military and 
volunteer militias to in an advise and assist training mission. 
Is It Too Late? 
Nouri al-Maliki is (thankfully) no longer Prime Minister. He was replaced by fellow 
Shiite Haider al-Abadi. Unfortunately, regardless of how much Abadi improves over Maliki, 
he cannot overcome the social cleavages inherent in society and government. Additionally, 
the war against ISIS has turned into a sectarian battle in large part due to the collapse of the 
Iraqi military. The Iraqi forces were perceived as Shia puppets for Iran anyway, but with 
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their public and embarrassing collapse in seemingly every battle, the Iranian’s have activated 
their Shia militias to protect shrines, mosques and population centers. They have also been 
co-opted as an unofficial arm of the Iraqi Security Forces, simply because they are the only 
entity, other than the Kurds, with the capability and resources to actually fight and defeat 
ISIS on the ground.  
US airstrikes have been vital in assisting Kurdish ground campaigns, particularly in 
the case of Mosul Dam and Kobane, where ISIS took heavy losses. Yet with the assaults 
launched ostensibly by fronts for the Iranian Qods Force, we are seeing history repeat itself; 
Shia militias are seeking retribution for ISIS massacres of Shiite towns, and in turn are 
committing their own human rights violations. All of this culminated in the much talked 
about Battle for Tikrit this spring. The Iranians bragged that it would be a cake walk, but they 
took extremely heavy casualties and much longer than anticipated to quell Tikrit. The US 
military refused to assist with launching airstrikes, due to Qods Force commander General 
Qassem Soleimani leading the operation in Tikrit. By all accounts the Iranians/ISF won the 
battle, but it was a lackluster preview of what to expect if and when Mosul, Fallujah and 
Ramadi are ever liberated.  
What Next? 
ISIS achieved a shocking military and political victory out of thin air. This chapter 
highlighted the events and circumstances that allowed them to do so. We know that ISIS 
would succumb to a full scale military assault from the US military. Yet, we also know that 
this would very much exacerbate Islamic anger towards the US, thereby boosting recruiting 
and anti-US terrorist attacks. We also know that the Obama administration is quite content to 
focus on striking via the air, occasionally authorizing special operations missions. Keeping 
all of this in mind, we look to Chapter V to discover what exactly makes ISIS tick, and how 
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DEFEAT, CONTAINMENT OR SETTLING? 
Throughout this thesis, we have consistently seen familiar themes such as: the role of 
Salafism in inspiring religious violence (against sects and infidels); the cult of personality 
build around Abu Musab al-Zarqawi; the hit parade of strategic and operational mistakes that 
American and Iraqi politicians made throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom; and finally, we 
have seen how the Sunni-Shia divide within Iraq against a backdrop of oppression has ignited 
a regional war based around an ostensibly resurrected Caliphate. 
So, where do we go from here? First, this chapter will examine the key centers of 
gravity for ISIS. These key centers are as follows: Ideology; Leadership; Information 
Operations; Recruitment. Once these key areas have been examined, then we will examine 
potential courses of action that will either defeat ISIS, contain ISIS, or do nothing of the sort 
and simply settle for the fact that we can do nothing about this powerhouse throwback to the 
7th century. 
Ideology 
As indicated in earlier chapters, ISIS is motivated in large part by Salafist-Jihadism. 
In particular, it is directly tied to the ideology espoused by Ibn Taymiyya, which as we now 
know had a large influence on Islamism throughout modern times. Yet, ISIS is a very special 
creation with regard to ideology. As former FBI Special Agent Ali Soufan has pointed out, 
ISIS subscribes to a synergistic yet very extreme ideology that was incubated for several 
years at the notorious prison camp at Camp Bucca, Iraq. Specifically, “IS now a chimera of 
Ba’athist and takfiri ideologies, with the organizational skills of the former helping channel 
the motivational fervor of the latter. The result is an extremist group unlike any other. It’s the 
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merging of Usama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein, with the strengths of one helping negate 
the weaknesses of the other.”1 That is a sobering and frightening assessment, but very much 
true. The merging of Ba’athist soldier with Salafist extremist has 2nd and 3rd order effects 
that provide ISIS with great depth in manning, leadership, strategy and tactics, and resilience.  
Further, Brookings Institute scholar Cole Bunzel indicated that even the US military’s 
best and brightest admittedly do not, even after all of this time, understand what make’s ISIS 
tick. Specifically, Major General Mike Nagata, the Commander of Centcom’s Theater 
Special Operations Command Component (SOCCENT), “confessed in late December 2014: 
‘We do not understand the movement, and until we do, we are not going to defeat it...We 
have not defeated the idea, we do not even understand the idea.”2  
Bunzel provides an absolutely eye-opening comparison of ISIS’s ideology, when 
contrasted with Al Qaeda: “If jihadism were to be placed on a political spectrum, al-Qaeda 
would be its left and the Islamic State its right. In contrast with al Qaeda, it is absolutely 
uncompromising on doctrinal matters, prioritizing the promotion of an unforgiving strain of 
Salafi thought.”3  In short, ISIS is driven to ensure the world belongs to their brand of 
Salafist-Jihadism. Eventually the Caliphate, in their view, will run the world. 
Leadership 
Ibrahim ibn ‘Awwad ibn Muhammad al-Badri, known as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, 
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lends significant credibility and weight to the ranks of ISIS. According to lead ideologue of 
ISIS, Turki al-Binali, Baghdadi is a direct descendant of the Quraysh, thus a descendant of 
the Prophet Muhammad.4 This is very significant (if it is true) in and of itself, due to the fact 
that apocalyptic prophecy always posits that a descendent of the Quraysh will return to lead 
the Caliphate into the end times. He reportedly has a PhD in Islamic jurisprudence, speaks 
eloquent classical Arabic, and even more importantly, he served time as a prisoner at Camp 
Bucca from 2004-2006, where he became friendly with several of the former Ba’athist 
military and intelligence officers that would come to form the operational core of ISIS. “In 
2006 he joined ISI as a judge and member of it’s Sharia councils.”5 Of course, after the 
leadership of ISI was decapitated by the joint Iraqi-US raid in April 2010, he was nominated 
largely via his ties to the Ba’athist members of the organization. In short, Baghdadi has 
checked all of the boxes, so to speak, for being a credible and authentic leader. He has the 
educational and family background that Zarqawi never had. 
Abu Muhammad al-Adnani is the second most powerful leadership center of gravity. 
He is a Syrian jihadist that “gave bay’a to Zarqawi before the US occupation of Iraq.”6 He 
did indeed fight in Iraq, but he was incarcerated for six years at a US prison camp. He too, is 
allegedly an Islamic scholar, “having taught theology and law at jihadi training camps.”7 
Adnani is exceedingly dangerous due to his status as spokesman for ISIS. When he speaks, 
the ever increasing pool of foreign fighters/new converts to Islam take notice and some will 
do his bidding. 
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 An example of his danger is the September 22, 2014 public call for Lone Wolf 
attacks. He implored jihadists to “kill a disbelieving American or European...or any other 
disbeliever from the disbelievers waging war...and kill him in any manner or way however it 
may be.”8 The most recent example of this was the foiled attack at a Garland, Texas anti-
Islam rally. Though Baghdadi and Adnani are certainly not the only two important 
personalities within ISIS, they are the most significant and valuable. If either were to die or 
be displaced, ISIS would still march on. However, it would have a significant degradation on 
operations, recruitment and planning 
Information Operations 
ISIS is well known in the public eye for its glossy, English language magazine titled 
Dabiq, after the prophetical location in Syria where the final battle between Muslims and the 
West will occur, after which Jesus Christ will allegedly descend from Heaven to destroy 
Christianity and evil. This prophetic revelation is relayed through various vignettes and 
scripture references in every issue of the publication. According to Terrence McCoy, 
“understanding the allure of that message, is key to understanding the incredible recruiting 
successes of the Islamic State, which is estimated to have drawn at least 12,000 foreign 
fighters from at least 74 countries.”9 Each issue of the magazine begins with the infamously 
attributed nod to Zarqawi and his “Spark” speech. A key theme of the magazine is the “us 
versus them” mentality of ISIS, where the world is divided into two spheres: Muslims and 
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non-Muslims. A choice has to be made on which camp to choose, and there is only one true 
way. Choosing the wrong one will damn you to hell and, by the way, may get you beheaded. 
Choosing the right one will make you a servant of Allah, give you a purpose, and a new life 
in the Caliphate. 
According to McCoy, “more than two thirds of people in Tunisia” answered 
favorably towards the ISIS message in a recent Pew Poll, and quite alarmingly, “72 percent 
of Iraqis responded that they would see the return of the messiah.”10 This magazine is a 
massive force multiplier for ISIS, and a propaganda piece that the US is having a very 
difficult time countering. 
With regard to video messaging, the ‘Message to America’ series that debuted 
globally in August 2014 was particularly damaging yet effective. In the debut video on 19 
August 2014, American hostage James Foley was beheaded, much like Nick Berg in 2004, in 
order to seek retribution for US airstrikes in defense of Kurds in Erbil, “with a warning to the 
US to interfere no further.”11 Subsequent videos were released with the same result, 
undermining US efforts to counter ISIS. Additionally, in concert with the Soldiers Harvest 
campaign in Iraq in 2012, a series titled “Clanging of the Swords” is largely credited for 
scaring the Iraqi Security Forces into submission. 
In short, the information operations campaign waged by ISIS is, aside from ideology, 
the most significant center of gravity, and one that will be extremely difficult to counter, 
particularly with regard to America’s abysmal track record with countering enemy 
propaganda. 
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As of 2014, according to Richard Barrett of The Soufan Group, “12,000 fighters from 
at least 81 countries have joined the civil war in Syria, and the numbers continue to grow.”12 
Often between 18-29 years old and overwhelmingly Western, J.M. Berger and Jessica Stern 
point out that “beyond age and gender, there are few consistent patterns and no reliable 
profile of who is likely to be a foreign fighter, but among Western recruits, a disproportionate 
number of converts can typically be found.”13 
As with similar conflicts, the problem with an influx of foreign fighters is its ability to 
be a force multiplier for groups like ISIS. In a Darwinian twist, those fighters who engage in 
combat, become further radicalized, and return home have the potential to return to their 
mosques and spread their virulent ideology, potentially inspiring many others to make the 
voyage to the battlefield and, according to Thomas Hegghammer, “they help kind of 
radicalize the conflict--make it more brutal. They probably also make the conflict more 
intractable, because the people who come as foreign fighters are, on average, more 
ideological than the typical Syrian rebel.” Additionally, Hegghammer tells us that foreign 
fighters are “overrepresented...among the perpetrators of the Islamic State’s worst acts.”14 
Thus, the recruitment of foreign fighters is the culmination of the other centers of 
gravity (ideology, information operations, leadership) in that, as state above, it is a force 
multiplier for foreign jihadists. In addition, particularly for the most radical who move their 
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families with them to the Caliphate, they run the risk of permanently radicalizing their 
children. In fact, children of ISIS foreign fighters are very quickly becoming a lost generation 
of sorts, due to the atrocities and indoctrination they are constantly exposed to. The next 
generation of jihadists will be even more uncompromising, violent, dedicated and tactically 
and technically savvy. In short, unless we come up with a sound strategy to neutralize ISIS 
soon, the world will become a far more dangerous place for the foreseeable future. 
Current Status 
The more things change, the more they stay the same. As of October 2014, The 
Soufan Group assessed that “the self-declared ‘Caliphate’...was in control of territory from 
north of Aleppo to south of Baghdad and including the cities of Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in 
Iraq. About six million people on either side of the Syria Iraq border were living under its 
rule.”15  
Though ISIS has certainly come under increased pressure via US airstrikes, Iranian-
supported and led Shia militias as well as pockets of tribes that have not been ethnically 
cleansed for standing up, ISIS keeps coming back to negate the gains. Additionally, the 
Financial Times’ most recent assessment stated the following: “after stunning the world 
when it swept through Iraq’s second city of Mosul last year, ISIS looked on backfoot under 
US-led coalition strikes earlier in 2015. But in the days leading up to the anniversary of 
Mosul’s June 10 fall, it surged forward again. As the coalition revamps its strategy, the crisis 
is not only threatening the borders between Syria and Iraq, but their continued existence as 
states.”16 
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Although, it is certainly worth noting that with the recent loss of Tal Abyad to 
Kurdish forces in Syria, “Kurdish rebel forces are only 50 kilometers” from their 
headquarters in Raqqa.17 However, since Raqqa is the physical and geographical symbol of 
ISIS, one can assess that a siege mentality would quickly become the norm around the city in 
order to project an image of invincibility and favor in the eyes of Allah. 
What Is The Strategy? 
Simply put, the US strategy is in a state of disarray. In the wake of multiple ISIS 
beheadings of American hostages, President Obama gave an address on September 10, 2014. 
In the speech, he first acknowledged the threat posed by ISIS to the Middle East and to the 
United States. According to the President, “our objective is clear: we will degrade, and 
ultimately, destroy ISIL, through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism 
strategy.”18 He continued to lay out the strategy as follows: “First, we will conduct a 
systematic campaign of airstrikes against these terrorists. Second, we will increase our 
support to forces fighting these terrorists on the ground. Third, we will continue to draw on 
our substantial counterterrorism capabilities to prevent ISIL attacks. Fourth, we will continue 
to provide humanitarian assistance to innocent civilians who have been displaced by this 
terrorist organization.”19 
While this plan sounds good on paper, it is ineffective. ISIS quickly adapted their 
tactics, techniques and procedures to the airstrikes. Also, the only consistently successful 
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fighters we support via airstrikes are the Kurds. The Iraqi Security Forces are still in poor 
shape, after having been gutted by Maliki in favor of Shiite partisanship. Though we 
ostensibly accidentally support the Iranian proxies via airstrike, even they have been blooded 
in battles against ISIS, particularly in Tikrit and Ramadi. Without a robust US troop presence 
on the ground to actually take the fight to the enemy, at best the airstrikes will manage to 
take out troop formations and vehicles. At worst, it will be an expensive and myopic half 
measure in the name of saying “we did something” about ISIS. 
Recently, President Obama admitted that “we don’t have, yet, a complete strategy” to 
combat ISIS.20 Not long after outlining the above strategy, President Obama admitted that he 
had overestimated the ability of the ISF to defend Iraq.21 In May of this year, after Ramadi 
fell to ISIS, the President was quoted as saying “If they are not willing to fight for the 
security of their country, we cannot do that for them.”22 Just last month, he also admitted that 
the much publicized training of both new ISF troops, Sunni tribal fighters, and a hodgepodge 
of Syrian rebels, “has not been happening as fast as it needs to be” but he still maintains that 
ISIS will be “driven out of Iraq and, ultimately it is going to be defeated.”23 
The reason that our strategy is no longer a working strategy is quite simple: nobody in 
Washington pays attention to significant dynamics. To begin with, if we are going to drive 
ISIS from Iraq, we must also drive them from Syria. This is a monumental undertaking that 
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will require much more than a few thousand rebels with Kalashnikovs, a dozen airstrikes a 
day, and a quarterly special operations raid. It requires a mature and honest political leader in 
Iraq to stand up and stop persecuting the Sunni population. At the same time, he must also 
protect the Shiites from revenge attacks on behalf of the Sunni. Even if we wake up 
tomorrow and ISIS is turned into dust, another version will replicate based solely on these 
social issues endemic to Iraq. Furthermore, as long as Bashar Assad clings to power like a 
wet cat clings to a bathtub, ISIS will exist. Forcing Assad to step down and finding a suitable 
replacement will also require major amounts of strategic military and political maneuvering. 
However, as long as Iran and Russia support Assad, nothing will change. Particularly for the 
Iranians, Syria is the crown jewel of their Shia Crescent hegemony in the region.  
Recently, LTG (Ret.) Michael Flynn, former director of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA), made the case against the Washington strategy. The General first states that 
the US must provide more direct combat support, such as intelligence and communications 
support.24 Additionally, he states “to defeat an enemy, you must first admit they exist, and 
this we have not done.”25 Flynn provides three strategic objectives necessary to defeat ISIS: 
“First, we have to energize every element of national power in a cohesive synchronized 
manner...to effectively resource what will likely be a multi-generational struggle. Second, we 
must engage the violent Islamists wherever they are, drive them from their safe havens and 
kill them. There can be no quarter and no accommodation. Third, we must decisively 
confront the state and non-state supporters and enablers of the violent Islamist ideology and 
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compel them to end their support to our enemies or be prepared to remove their capacity to 
do so.”26  
In my assessment, General Flynn’s policy prescription is the best out there. I would 
only add the following: whether or not Haider al-Abadi is the right man for Iraq, we must use 
every amount of credibility in our military, intelligence and diplomatic channels to nurture 
and coach him, much like George W. Bush attempted to do with Maliki. We must not leave 
the Iraqi political establishment to their own devices. Until we can shape the environment to 
be amenable for a politician to grant equal protection to both Sunni and Shia, we must resign 
ourselves to two possibilities: 1) more of the same sectarian violence, but only worse; 2) the 
return of a strongman in the image of Saddam Hussein, who uses absolutely draconian 
measures to hold down all of the nefarious actors in society, in the name of security and 
stability. 
Additionally, we must come to a compromise with the Iranians over Bashar al-Assad. 
Short of direct military action in Syria, the US can only hope to shape Syria into the most 
secure environment possible, given the vital importance attached to Syria for their virtual 
empire. 
Finally, in addition to the mass killing of ISIS that General Flynn suggested, we must 
use every computer network operation resource possible to find, fix and finish the vital 
information nodes ISIS depends on to disseminate their virulent ideology to the masses. By 
degrading or destroying their digital networks, we can begin to take back the electronic 
battlespace. 
Unless some or all of these things happen, expect ISIS to continue what they are 
doing, until the Saudi’s or the Iranians grows tired of their games and unloads on them 




without regard for collateral damage, public opinion, or Western social norms and mores. In 
short, a case of total war, vice limited war. Make no mistake, there is no hope in simply 
degrading, containing or settling with ISIS. They must be stopped. As more time elapses, 
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